Farmer discontent in periurban Bangalore: The utopia of agricultural modernization, neoliberal developmentalism and the 21st century global city by Lee, Zhe Yu
Macalester College
DigitalCommons@Macalester College
Geography Honors Projects Geography Department
5-1-2015
Farmer discontent in periurban Bangalore: The
utopia of agricultural modernization, neoliberal
developmentalism and the 21st century global city
Zhe Yu Lee
Macalester College, leezy1990@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/geography_honors
Part of the Geography Commons
This Honors Project - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Geography Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Geography Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lee, Zhe Yu, "Farmer discontent in periurban Bangalore: The utopia of agricultural modernization, neoliberal developmentalism and
the 21st century global city" (2015). Geography Honors Projects. Paper 47.
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/geography_honors/47
  
 
 
Farmer discontent in periurban 
Bangalore: The utopia of agricultural 
modernization, neoliberal 
developmentalism and the 21st century 
global city 
 
Zhe Yu Lee 
Advisor: Professor William Moseley 
 
Department of Geography 
Macalester College 
St Paul, Minnesota 
April 28 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
Today’s agricultural production in periurban Bangalore is structured by deteriorating 
ecological conditions and lack of enabling economic environment. Many farmers live in  
precarity even as market logic has become hegemonic given the dominance of input and 
capital-intensive cash crop production, a situation exacerbated by the threat of 
government-driven land acquisition. In my honors thesis, I argue that epistemological 
assumptions regarding agricultural modernization and neoliberal developmentalism that 
undergird this mode of production have come to largely structure the operation of 
institutional frameworks and individual subjectivities. However, these “external” 
influences are never fully totalizable and by invoking notions of assemblage and 
hybridity, I contend that Bangalore’s metropolitan area serves as a “site” of ongoing 
contestation, allowing for a critical assessment of India’s current development trajectory 
more broadly. 
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Preface 
“...knowledge works its power by being affective. Its truth effects are to be measured by 
its force of dispersion; not by its efforts to confirm the known and the given, or the said 
and the seen. These latter are also functions of knowledge—but not as levers of critique, 
rather as sentries of the status quo. Knowledge functions critically when it releases 
thought (“thought” understood here as the potential to arrest, trouble, alter, even shatter, 
the barnacle-like deposits of accustomed or encrusted thinking)” (Gidwani, 2011, 211).  
 
 How did a Singaporean studying at an American liberal arts college in St Paul, 
Minnesota come to embark on a year-long project to critically understand the logics of 
agrarian change in India? Truth be told, I am not really entirely sure. My motivation can 
be attributed to a worldview that comprehends the current world-system as one that is 
fundamentally unjust wherein the lasting cognitive, epistemological, material and 
discursive aftereffects of centuries of colonialism, exploitation and domination are elided 
while seemingly unproblematic tropes of development, modernization and progress take 
over and are romanticized as automatically catalyzing global prosperity. Growing up in 
Southeast Asia (a majority of the time in Singapore) has given me a first-hand experience 
of being in an environment that emphasizes personal and collective adherence to 
unbridled capitalist growth as a means to guarantee individual success and the realization 
of a good society. Somehow, I did not take these discourses at face value and starting at a 
basic level of recognizing the environmental consequences of such an economic 
paradigm, I have today become extremely critical of managerial and technology oriented 
approaches that seemingly have a monopoly in the framing of solutions to complex 
societal problems. Relatedly, I have come to realize that these supposed value-free 
knowledge claims do not simply exist naturally, but they are created, legitimized and 
naturalized through historical and sociological contestation.   
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Hence, my critical take on interlinked environment/development issues, coupled 
with a commitment to realizing systemic alternatives have led me to situate my academic 
interests at the intersection of political ecology, critical development studies and science 
and technology studies. A related foray into critical agrarian studies has allowed me to 
understand how issues of food security, hunger and agricultural production continue to be 
framed technocratically for the most part. Hence, the genealogical tracing of specific 
intellectual histories allow a deeper understanding to why such discourses only 
interrogate a limited range of ideas within a pre-given narrow epistemological paradigm. 
In this vein, this honors thesis has allowed me to hone relevant interests in history of 
science, postcolonial theory, poststructuralism and politics of knowledge production. The 
evolution of Green Revolution discourses and logics of agrarian change in India from the 
1960s up till today is a perfect example that ties these theoretical commitments together. 
My academic training in geography in its emphasis on space and scale has also permitted 
me to recognize the mechanics of knowledge flows and how they come to structure 
human activity in specific spatial contexts at specific moments in time.  
Lastly, I acknowledge that the scholarly community that has interrogated the 
Indian post-independence nation-state is extremely vast and which have given rise to 
multiplicitous interpretations of the country’s social, cultural, economic and ecological 
transformation over the past half-century. Specifically, I have been piqued by the work in 
subaltern studies, noting its origin in analyses of agrarian structures and its linkages with 
varying historiographical interpretations on India as well as questions of cultural identity, 
finding its intersection with critical development studies particularly fascinating. In 
addition, the work of left-leaning/Marxist economists have also provided numerous 
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insights to problematizing and providing crucial counterpoints to the romanticization of 
the narrative of India’s growth story over the last half century. I hope I am able to suggest 
nuanced perspectives in my attempt at synthesizing different interdisciplinary theoretical 
and methodological standpoints that are in conversation with my fieldwork findings. This 
project is by no means the final word and I do not pretend to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the issues that influence agricultural production in India, not to mention 
questions of regional variability as well as specific insights into caste, religion and local 
culture that I do not address in this honors thesis.  
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Chapter I: Overview and Introduction 
In 2008, the World Bank published its annual report with a specific explicit focus 
on “agriculture for development,” the first time in 25 years that it had done so (World 
Bank, 2007). It posits that global food security will primarily be achieved with ever 
greater commitment to both the use of technological inputs and market/export-driven 
production centered on enhancing value-added commodity chains. This productivist 
argument is framed quantitatively given the dominance of representative graphs and 
figures to illustrate both the perceived need to increase production justified mainly on the 
basis of positive correlations between certain technological, economic and governance 
variables with growth rates and production levels. 
Despite multifaceted criticisms (Oya, 2009; McMichael, 2009) that have been 
raised, the seemingly neutral representation of the food security problem has only 
become been reinforced since then, exemplified at last year’s World Food Prize and 
Borlaug Dialogue in Des Moines, Iowa, which brings together on an annual basis many 
of the big gun stakeholders in industrial agriculture. Given the parallel celebration of the 
Borlaug Centennial marking 100 years since the birth of Norman Borlaug, it may come 
as no surprise that Sanjaya Rajaram was named this year’s World Food Prize Laureate. 
As Borlaug’s protégé in terms of sustaining his legacy of wheat breeding, this award for 
Rajaram appears to reinforce the importance of celebrating what Borlaug was said to 
have achieved whilst also ensuring that current research efforts at the International Maize 
and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico where Rajaram is based, continue 
to be perceived to play an important role in meeting global agricultural research needs. It 
is also noteworthy to acknowledge that Rajaram was born in India but has become a 
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naturalized Mexican citizen given that Borlaug pioneered many Green Revolution ideas 
and technologies in Mexico in the mid-20th century before they were subsequently 
institutionalized in India’s post-independence agricultural sector.  
Plenary sessions that I attended did not depart from what continues to be an 
overwhelmingly productivist paradigm, grounded in unceasing faith in what are framed 
as infrastructures of scientific research, technological innovation and financial investment 
and financialization, justified on the basis of meeting the needs of the planet's nine billion 
population in 2050. There is also an assumption that all farmers can take advantage of 
opportunities through the establishment of national and international value-chain 
arrangements afforded by the demand of a diverse range of food and non-food crops 
coming from the emerging global middle class. It seems that recent criticisms implicit in 
the discussions of agroecology, food sovereignty and local foods have not been able to 
significantly disrupt this technocratic discourse given that the dialogue seemed to be a 
self-congratulatory echo chamber, glossing over questions of equity, large-scale 
environmental pollution and alternative forms of production. Whilst there was 
acknowledgment of problems such as chemical overuse and land degradation, many of 
the proposed solutions were couched optimistically in technocratic terms of increased 
productivity, efficiency and sustainable intensification that would take advantage of latest 
advances in solutions presented by big data, precision agriculture and the genomics 
revolution (Lee, 2014). 
 In stark contrast, my field experience in engaging with small farmers through 
focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews in periurban Bangalore over six 
weeks in June-July 2014 presented a completely different reality with regards to 
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continued viability of agricultural production. What I noticed were production practices 
constrained by deteriorating environmental conditions, increasing input costs, breakdown 
in nutrient cycles, reduced efficacy of agricultural technologies and lack of enabling 
economic environment. Despite market logic being hegemonic given the dominance of 
capital-intensive cash crop production over traditional modes of subsistence that existed 
before the institutionalization of Green Revolution infrastructures, many farmers lead 
precarious lives. Even as a desire exists amongst some to transition away from 
technological and capital-centric modes of production, many are stuck in ecological, 
infrastructural and economic vicious cycles. This is further exacerbated by altered village 
social structures and dynamics. Whereas the ideas of caste distinctions have weakened, 
pre-existing community solidarity, cooperation and collectivization have diminished as 
production have become mainly motivated around maximizing incomes. Many household 
members also rely on menial opportunities in garment, automobile and low-skill 
manufacturing facilities dotting the periurban landscape to supplement volatile 
agricultural incomes. What I experienced in Bangalore further aligns with recent 
academic conversations regarding the smallholder agrarian crisis in India and the 
complex dislocations caused by transitions from subsistence to market dominated 
production (Narasimha and Mishra, 2009; Lerche et al, 2013) portrayed in the media in 
recent years by rampant cases of farmer suicides recorded in many Indian states.  
More broadly, it is important to acknowledge how this project of agricultural 
modernization is also part of the wider push to unquestionably accept the presupposed 
universal validity of the logic of developmentalism. This began in earnest in India with 
the country’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s push in the early 1950s to 
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implement what is deemed to be the unavoidable and necessary teleological 
transformation of the country’s economy from subsistence agricultural production to low 
and then high value industrial activity and finally towards growing the service sector 
characterized by the purported inevitability of fulfilling the needs of high proportions of 
populations who will move into urban areas in the years ahead. Hence, at one level, 
agricultural production in many parts of India is increasingly being subsumed under 
industrial logics with the intention of emphasizing specialization given relentless focus 
on maximizing mechanistic food and non-food cash crop production, a trend that has not 
allowed many small farmers to stably reproduce their livelihoods, let alone increase their 
standards of living. On another level, long-term prospects for agricultural production 
specifically in periurban Bangalore are further threatened by state-sanctioned land 
acquisition, which is necessary if it desires to expand and attain the ideal of a global city, 
characterized by the growth high-value IT, biotech and real estate sectors. 
Unsurprisingly, an overwhelming sentiment amongst many farmers I spoke to living in 
areas surrounding the Bangalore core expressed that they neither feel any direct 
connection nor believe that the city’s development will meaningfully improve their lives.   
This economic paradigm will only intensify in the months and years ahead with 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s policy approach that is grounded in an even more deep-
rooted commitment to neoliberal economic doctrine since he came to power in early 
2014. Using the populist rhetoric of catalyzing increased growth rates that are assumed to 
benefit a majority (with many public statements that explicitly invoke the term 
“development”), Modi has rolled out a series of policy initiatives in the last year in part to 
further complete the unfinished project of liberalization reforms (a constant trope in 
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global mainstream economic discourse) to create a more business friendly regulatory 
environment to attract foreign direct investment and establish public-private partnerships 
(Wright, 2014). With specific regards to agriculture, there are policy proposals to further 
entrench the existing technological and capital-intensive paradigm with the potential 
legalization of commercial genetically modified crops, loosening of regulations on the 
marketing of agricultural products, scientific soil testing to underserved areas and the 
building of infrastructures to improve connections between farmers and potential markets 
(Das and Bhardwaj, 2015; Dutta, 2015; The Indian Express, 2014). In addition, there are 
proposals to further liberalize land acquisition laws that aim to reduce the need of 
obtaining consent from farmers, in the name of decreasing bureaucratic roadblocks that 
disincentivize what are seen as much-needed investment from the national and 
international business community (Prusty and Daniel, 2015).   
The notion of the “truth regime” will be a recurring concept I will constantly refer 
to describe how certain constructed ideas regarding agricultural production and the 
structuring of the economy more broadly have come to be seen as objective universals. It 
is a term that is derived from Michel Foucault’s lectures in Discipline and Punish where 
he describes how individuals come to accept the supposed the need to conform to certain 
universal truths about how to behave in the context of schools, prisons and the military. 
Importantly, its power is not mainly characterized as a top-down imposition of external 
ideas, but rather is manifested at the micro-level, wherein individuals over time come to 
willingly accept these ideas as truths and modify their behavior as a result. I apply this 
logic to understand how epistemological assumptions in agricultural modernization and 
developmentalism more broadly gain truth value at the level of the individual and 
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relatedly show how this conceptualization of power potentially hinders possibilities of 
realizing radical change. In this vein, logics of agrarian change in terms of the ongoing 
shift away from a subsistence paradigm towards a technoscientific and market orientation 
as well as how ideas underlying the economy’s transformation towards a concerted push 
to grow “high-value” industrial, service and urban sectors remain hegemonic for the most 
part despite a myriad of negative effects that have already been experienced by small 
farmers in periurban Bangalore and elsewhere in India.  
This honors thesis will attempt to answer the following question: why do 
dominant ideas surrounding agricultural modernization and Rostowian developmentalism 
in amongst small farmers and as manifested in policies in places such as periurban 
Bangalore remain seemingly legitimate despite significant negative dislocations that have 
been noted and what are the implications for the future of India’s development trajectory? 
Fundamentally, I attribute this mainly to the emergence of Foucauldian “truth regimes” 
that have manifested themselves most clearly at the microlevel with the willingness of 
individuals to broadly accept the necessity of using agricultural technologies as well as 
the desirability of improvement on the basis of earning monetary incomes inherent in the 
logic of developmentalism that were present from the beginning of India’s post-
independence nation-building project. This has led many small farmers to believe that 
benefits of urbanization and industrialization as India becomes a global economic 
superpower will eventually allow for better livelihood prospects for them as well. 
However, despite the continued relentless romanticization of these abstracted tropes in 
mainstream national and international discourse, I argue that the continued 
implementation of policies stemming from these knowledge doctrines cannot be complete 
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given the possibility of further social dislocations and ecological deterioration 
increasingly undermine developmentalism’s promises more explicitly, the inability of 
scientific abstractions to completely interrogate complex socio-ecological contexts as 
well as the persistence of traditional practices, knowledges and cultural meanings that are 
not completely subsumable under dominant logics. Hence, by utilizing an assemblage 
theory lens to understand the Bangalore metropolitan area as constituted by hybrid 
landscapes, peoples and institutions that are neither fully urban nor rural, we can 
characterize it as a “site” of ongoing contestation with regards to assessing legitimacy of 
developmentalist logic.  
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Chapter II: Methodology 
In this sense, I use a mixed methods methodology in my honors thesis to allow me 
to understand how current logics of agrarian and economic change in periurban 
Bangalore are both indicative of and contribute to the larger story regarding 
transformations taking place in Indian society more broadly. A significant portion will 
consist of tracing histories of how the project of agricultural modernization epitomized by 
the Green Revolution moment in 1968 has become institutionalized as well as how the 
parallel project of developmentalism informed initially by direct state involvement 
transitioned to an increasingly free-market orientation in the last three decades or so. 
Therefore, I put this into conversation with rich secondary (theoretical) literature, a 
discursive analysis of primary sources such as relevant World Bank and Government of 
India reports as well as my fieldwork findings. 
With specific regards to how I gathered my qualitative fieldwork data, I along 
with local collaborators from Azim Premji University (APU) were able to conduct a 
series of focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews in around 12 villages 
within 4 taluks or sub-districts to the North, West and South of the Bangalore 
metropolitan area. My local collaborators were part of a research team who were 
engaging in a policy-oriented long-term study of small farmer livelihood strategies not 
only in periurban Bangalore, but also in the state of Karnataka more broadly. As a first-
timer doing fieldwork, my initial interests and research questions I came up with before 
arriving in India were subsequently informed by preparatory discussions with my 
collaborators who provided important contextual information (in terms of local politics, 
policies, ecological and geographical histories, land use/economic histories). The 
12 
 
distances of villages we were able to conduct fieldwork in ranged from 35 to 60 miles 
from the center of Bangalore, with the closest being at the edge of the metropolitan core 
on land that had already been cleared for the continued expansion of the city. 
Identification of the villages was done on the basis of combining what was convenient to 
access in addition to pre-existing information that APU had regarding where land 
acquisition had already taken place. An extent of snowball sampling was done by asking 
individuals for contacts of other farmers who were willing to speak to us. Altogether, I 
was able to speak to around 40 groups of farmers ranging from 2 to 15 individuals. In the 
case of larger groups, 3-4 farmers dominated the discussion. Interactions with the farmers 
took place mostly in the village’s common use area, in addition to in the farmer’s homes 
or fields as well. Most of the farmers I talked to live in villages where most households 
owned between 0.5 to 4 hectares of land, some of which were distributed as a result of 
the limited land reform and affirmative action for communities of lower castes that 
occurred after India’s independence.  
The questions I used to frame the discussions interrogated the following themes:   
• Approximate age of farmer and type of production  
•  Changes over the past 20-25 years and what they think will happen in the next 5-
10 years regarding land acquisition/land purchase, environmental conditions 
(water, soil, climate change), influence of Bangalore’s growth, changes in labor 
availability and preference as well as increased industrial/factory jobs, new actors 
in the agricultural sector 
• Questions that get at opinions/sentiments/worldviews on development, agrarian 
transitions, knowledge production/external expertise and government policies  
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 I believe that by engaging with these farmers with local collaborators in addition 
to explaining our intentions in the most earnest way possible allowed us to gain their 
trust. Eventually, many of these interactions did not end up being mechanical formal back 
and forth, but rather conversations became informal discussions. On another hand, I do 
not claim that my interpretations fully capture all the nuances that the small farmers 
expressed and that my representation of their experiences in textual form in this honors 
thesis is by no means objective given that three languages (English, Kannada and Hindi) 
were used to mediate the discussions compounded by the fact that I was only present in 
the field for a short duration (6 weeks). Another limiting factor would be my own lack of 
lived experience engaging directly in agricultural production. I am firmly committed to 
the epistemological-methodological standpoint that there will always be a degree of 
incommensurability between the lived experience of research participants and academic 
scholarship expressed through the form of a written narrative. 
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Chapter III: The construction of the “truth regime” of agricultural modernization 
in India 
 
Ideas surrounding agricultural modernization have been present in India for over a 
century and arguably began with the archival discursive portrayal of the Indian 
agricultural sector as backward and unproductive in the late 19th century, reinforced with 
a major drought in 1897, with famine events that followed in the subsequent two years. In 
official records, these events were vividly and in no uncertain terms with dystopic 
descriptions such as “barren lands of the Deccan, none too rich at best of times are fast 
being turned into tracts of dismal, sun cracked, desert charred earth whose friable edges 
are caught by the wind” (Nehru, 1989, 13). While possibly true to some extent, this 
subjective representation would easily justify the necessity of external assistance to 
improve the presupposed underdeveloped state of the agricultural sector. This would 
catalyze the founding of the Imperial Agricultural Research Institute (which would in 
1947 become the Indian Agricultural Research Institute or IARI) as well as Departments 
of Agriculture at the provincial level in the early years of the 20th century. Beginning in 
1905, each “of these provincial institutions [would have] an expert agriculturist, an 
economic botanist, an agricultural chemist, an entomologist and a mycologist” (Nehru, 
1989, 14-15). Consequently, taxonomy studies increased with the classification of soil 
types into objective scientific categories to reductively, quantitatively and discretely 
assess their nutrient content self-justified the focus on the derivation and use of chemical 
fertilizers. The creation of discrete commodity committees in the mid-1940s such as in 
sugarcane, tobacco and oilseeds to coordinate research and investment and disseminate 
information exemplifies reductionist production approaches that aimed at yield 
maximization. 
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Furthermore, the inequitable land tenure framework in India has been a 
longstanding societal phenomenon given the prominence of zamindars (landlords) who 
controlled large tracts of land for hundreds of years and which lasted through British 
colonial rule. Rather than engaging in what would be highly contested processes of land 
redistribution, the British “reverted ultimately to the safe ground of suggesting that 
improved agricultural practices and new technology” (Januzzi, 1994, 18) would 
guarantee long-term food security. This approach that prioritized technological 
advancements over equitable access to land and smallholder well-being was especially 
salient in the Royal Commission on Agriculture’s report of 1928, which was tasked to 
provide an assessment of the state of food production in the early 1900s. “Issues such as 
land reform were excluded from the terms of reference to ensure that the commission’s 
work did nothing to threaten the British Government of India’s working relationship with 
members of the landholding elite” (Januzzi, 1994, 5), highlighting that the political 
battles regarding the distribution of land and resources did not end up favoring small 
farmers.  
To further justify this approach, it was assumed in the early 20th century, 
“without empirical evidence, that small, fragmented landholdings were inherently 
inefficient whereas large, consolidated holdings were inherently likely to promote 
economic efficiency” (Januzzi, 1994, 10) and the “Royal Commission’s findings 
ultimately rested on the notion that India’s landholding elites could become effective 
agents of rural transformation” (Januzzi, 1994, 19). Hence, smallholder farmer 
knowledge and practices that are attuned to local socio-ecological contexts are doubly 
marginalized, in the sense that they are not only delegitimized in the eyes of the scientific 
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community, but their perspectives also are not represented in official histories of Indian 
agriculture. As the agricultural research infrastructure was strengthened in the years 
leading up to independence, it was also compounded by the success in the 1930s US 
Midwest of “plant breeding ma[king] American farms the world’s most productive even 
before mechanization and chemicals lengthened their lead” (Cullather, 2010, 3). An 
initial degree of complexity and eclecticism with regards to appropriate technological 
strategies that did persist in IARI-led research approaches (Saha, 2013) was to be 
obscured and eventually forgotten in the years ahead, especially in light of the “food 
crisis created by the Second World War and the Bengal famine of 1943 [with] a ‘Grow 
More Food’ Campaign initiated in 1943” (Nehru, 1989, 28).   
Any remaining diverse sentiments would disappear at the moment of India’s 
independence, when the country’s agricultural sector remained dominantly represented as 
undeveloped. For it to prosper, it was presumed that it had to continue to embrace 
technological expertise derived elsewhere. Accompanying this was an impression 
amongst the national intellectual elite “that the people in rural areas were [neither] 
equipped to give expression to their own needs and interests [nor could they] be expected 
to be capable of action in their own behalf.” For them to move away from their 
uneducated ways, they “would have to be exhorted, organized, taught or even compelled 
by outsiders” (Januzzi, 1994, 46-47). This internal, national discourse would already gain 
a developmentalist character with the intention of “chang[ing] the character of Indian 
agriculture from subsistence farming on small uneconomic holdings to economic farming 
on units of production that would benefit from economies of scale and yield a marketable 
surplus to meet the needs of a growing population” (Januzzi, 1994, 69).  
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Hence, notions of modernization were not alien to the country’s first Prime 
Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru given his personal disconnect with rural life as “an urbanized 
Kashmiri Brahmin who had been educated at Harrow and Cambridge in the United 
Kingdom, describ[ing] himself as having been cut adrift from the outlook of peasants” 
(Januzzi, 1994, 38). However, rather than necessarily introducing a wholehearted 
capitalist market logic, “Nehru and his Congress Party colleagues had understood 
centrally planned development as an essential part of their nationalist campaign.” 
Therefore, at the highest political levels, active state involvement in the economy was 
seen as essential in catalyzing “the route to Indian independence and prosperity [which 
would primarily comprise of] the production of steel, iron, machine tools, chemicals and 
electric power” (Latham, 2011, 68) by harnessing of surplus labor stemming from what 
was perceived as its unproductive agricultural sector. This approach of promoting 
industrialization from the outset of India’s independence was reflected in the Planning 
Commission’s five year plans. In the country’s second five year plan, allocated resources 
for agriculture were already marginalized with increased emphasis on “greater public 
investment in capital goods production and industrialization” (Latham, 2011, 69). 
This push was also influenced by the international post-War context, with the 
term development itself first entering mainstream discourse in 1949, one year after 
India’s independence 1949 as “Point Four” of President Truman’s inaugural speech. It 
was strengthened by Walt Rostow, a key economic advisor to the post-Truman 
Eisenhower presidency who proposed his stages of growth developmentalist model 
wherein the move from subsistence agriculture to market-oriented industrial 
manufacturing and finally the service sector was seen as desirable, necessary and 
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inevitable. (Latham, 2011). This would entail that presumed inherent potential “energies 
of the masses of the people [would come to be] released into channels of constructive 
effort aimed at greater production, greater exchange and greater consumption” (Latham, 
2011, 11). Rather than merely being an altruistic initiative to help newly independent 
countries in Africa and Asia move past the dislocations resulting from colonial rule, 
strategic motives existed to influence governments and populations to achieve this by 
accepting the exigency of externally-derived solutions of “development aid, technical 
assistance, foreign investment and integrated planning.” In official discourse, 
justifications for such an approach were couched in terms of the reckoned unproblematic 
nature of “economic growth, industrialization and rising living standards” (Latham, 2011, 
3) without meaningful regard for possible incompatibility with existing socio-cultural 
practices.  
As a result of initial disproportionate focus on ensuring the success of industrial 
development, “Indian planners were happy to steer US aid toward agriculture while 
diverting other resources into manufacturing” (Cullather, 2010, 137). In the early 1950s, 
India came to rely on the United States for cheap food grains to not only make up for 
supply shortfalls, but also to stabilize food prices and minimize inflation. At the same 
time, the provision of this food should not be seen as “aid” per se as it helped to reduce 
the US grain surplus caused by farm prices supports. Therefore, this surplus became a 
tool of US foreign policy, officialized in legislation “in Public Law 480 [(PL 480)], the 
Food for Peace program, passed in 1954, [which] expand[ed] by 1958 to more than $6 
billion with the largest shipments, principally wheat and cotton, going to India” 
(Cullather, 2010, 142). However, it was realized that into the early 1960s that India could 
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not excessively rely on foodgrain imports from the United States and that it had to build 
up its own national capacity to increase production levels. The provision of this “cheap 
food [had] created an atmosphere of confidence [wherein policymakers] came to value 
the psychology of abundance created by PL 480.” This sudden influx of these foodgrains 
also led to the “demand for coarse cereals--maize, millet, lentils and barley f[alling] off, 
[with this] shift in diet hit[ting] growers of traditional staples hard [whilst] total food 
production dropped triggering spot shortages and price fluctuations” (Cullather, 2010, 
144). This exogenous disruption, exacerbated by already lower proportions of 
governmental resources provided towards the agricultural sector to some extent created 
the “problem” of food insecurity it purported to solve. 
These ideas of market and technological superiority that slowly became dominant 
in governmental and bureaucratic institutions cannot be considered natural, but instead 
must be seen as being promoted by international experts who assumed the already 
existing character of “fundamental laws governing supply, demand, production and 
consumption [being] appli[cable] to all economies, everywhere” (Latham, 2011, 50). 
These objective abstractions allowed these interventions to be perceived by most 
individuals as non-ideological in that increased market-centric production bolstered by 
technological advancement could not be seen as biased in any way. This becomes 
especially salient when the socio-economic situations in different countries began to be 
posited as comparable on the basis of a normative reference point. Central to this would 
be the emergence of statistical regimes globally that allowed for modes of 
conceptualizing “the economy” as a discrete category or object of concern (Mitchell, 
2002) and which subsequently began to serve as criteria on which government decision-
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making was based upon. This included the new notion of ‘gross national product’ 
invented to reductively assess the success of solving “enormously complex questions 
about the causes of poverty or the persistence of inequality” (Patel, 2013, 11). Numbers 
were assumed to be imbued with a characteristic of objectivity that did not have any 
explicit political motive, therefore casting the project of improvement as one of 
replicative, top-down technocratic management. Many initiatives that had a singular 
focus on creating economic value “were designed for ‘display’ to produce statistical 
victories or as carefully staged spectacles dramatizing the fruits of modernity” (Cullather, 
2010, 5) without critical assessment if communities actually desired for and gained from 
these transformations.  
One example of this was the implementation of a wide-ranging Community 
Development Program (CDP) by the Ford Foundation. It was hoped that “after a period 
of intensive intervention, a village would undergo a collective psychological awakening, 
after which progress would accelerate through the peasants’ own initiative. The 
transformed village would then become a beacon of modernity, diffusing technical and 
administrative innovations into the surrounding territory” (Cullather, 2010, 78). This 
seemingly emancipatory outlook was presupposed on the rational response of individuals 
towards ideas, knowledges and technologies that would mechanistically improve rural 
livelihoods. In this sense, it explicitly “sought more concrete psychological and 
physiological solutions that would address the fundamental components of human 
motivation” (Cullather, 2010, 189), thus assuming the existence of universal, rational 
behavior that would constitute the adoption of knowledge that would focus on 
maximizing output. Hence, inefficient and unproductive modes of production that are 
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more epistemologically complex, ecologically compatible and culturally appropriate were 
characterized as primitive and thus were delegitimized. 
The CDP was enacted in the spirit of the country’s acceptance of the paradigm of 
technological transformation with the signing of the US-India Technical Cooperation 
Agreement in 1951, which “facilitated the US government’s involvement in 
strengthening agricultural research and education in India” (Saha, 2013, 206). This would 
go on to build up relevant institutional infrastructures, underpinned by the wholehearted 
acceptance of externally derived expertise. The country would host the “world’s largest 
fertilizer demonstration program,” which constituted the “collect[ion of] volumes of data 
on fertilizer use in India under different soil and climatic conditions [along with the] 
establish[ment of] a cartographic and a radiotracer laboratory at IARI that could conduct 
national-level soil surveys and prepare soil maps” (Cullather, 2010, 189). Subsequently, a 
significant development occurred “in 1956, [when] an agreement was reached between 
the Ministry and the [Rockefeller] Foundation; the foundation was to assist in the 
development of the postgraduate school of agriculture at IARI and assist in the 
development of national research programmes on the improvement of some [staple] 
cereal crops” (Nehru, 1989, vii). This approach would intensify into the early 1960s with 
Rockefeller Foundation resources going into All-India Coordinated Research Projects 
(Nehru, 1989) and the Ford Foundation starting its “Intensive Agricultural Districts 
Program [(IADP), an initiative] that grew out of its community development [efforts] the 
1950s. It operated in 15 of the 320 CD districts, providing irrigation, credit, fertilizer, 
improved seeds and technical advice, staged to display gains in productivity rather than 
welfare” (Cullather, 2010, 207). A key domestic actor in this IADP effort was M.S 
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Swaminathan, who “in April 1962, [as a member of IARI’s wheat research team] drafted 
a grant proposal for an intensive breeding program using dwarf varieties from Mexico, 
fund[ed] from Rockefeller Foundation and PL 480 counterpart funds” (Cullather, 2010, 
195). This would signify the beginning of Norman Borlaug’s involvement in India in the 
lead up to what would to become the (in)famous Green Revolution with his first visit in 
spring 1963. Thereafter, “Borlaug sent samples of the Mexican wheat for sowing in the 
fall season. When they proved up to three times as productive as local varieties, Indian 
officials began a national campaign to distribute the new seeds” (Latham, 2011, 115-
116). This success was repeated in 1964 when “the test varieties of semi-dwarf Mexican 
wheat gave impressively high yields of 2,900–3,700 kilograms per hectare in different 
IARI research plots” (Saha, 2013, 306). 
Arguably, the necessity for the implementation of the Green Revolution itself 
should be regarded as highly contested as opposed to the inevitable next step for India to 
achieve food security. While weather conditions did deteriorate from 1965-1967, there 
was no consensus on the severity of the “drought.” Similar to how the emergence of 
statistical regimes create rather than merely represents reality, definitions, ideas and 
judgments surrounding famine and drought have to be determined subjectively as these 
socio-ecological (and not merely natural) phenomena do not have any self-evident 
quality in and of themselves. Rather as problems that were framed domestically, “the 
1965 [harvest] forecasts originated at USDA headquarters in Washington. [President] 
Johnson needed to persuade Indian officials that a crisis existed [despite the fact that] 
statistical forecasts were vague as to the contexts of specific time and place. The ERS 
model [that was used] forecast a shortfall for the whole of India in annualized terms [and] 
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assumed causal relationships between population growth, technical competence and food 
availability while implicitly discounting causes such as land tenure, wages, conflict and 
trade relations” (Cullather, 2010, 220-221). In addition to the problems surrounding 
aggregation of heterogeneous conditions, the models employed resulted in widely 
contrasting estimates, highlighted by how the US State Department estimated a foodgrain 
shortfall of 18 million tons vs. 3.5 million tons given by the US Central Intelligence 
Agency (Cullather, 2010). In India, government departments especially at a sub-national 
level, “officials declared the famine a sham. Despite the drought’s severity, food stocks 
remained adequate [with] Planning Commissioners point[ing] out hunger was more 
prevalent in the cities and that the problem was not food supply but unemployment” 
(Cullather, 2010, 223). 
In light of this, the initial dominant representation of the Green Revolution 
especially towards the international audience undoubtedly expressed a sentiment of 
unparalleled success of an effort to alleviate concerns over starving populations. Official 
aggregate statistics in “February 1968 pointed to a record year, sharply above the 
previous year and modestly above the 1964-1965 high, [with empirical observations 
recording] railways [running] out of freight cars and the government beg[inning] filling 
school buildings, sugar mills and theaters with grain” (Cullather, 2010, 232). 
Nevertheless, as a result of the continued belief at the national level in focusing on 
technological solutions as a means to solve problems surrounding food security, 
resources devoted to the Indian Council on Agricultural Research (ICAR), an 
organization under IARI would increase from 61 million rupees in the pre-Green 
Revolution third five-year plan to 2.52 billion in fifth five-year plan rupees and 5.48 
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billion rupees in the sixth five-year plan. By the 1980s, this agricultural research 
infrastructure would comprise of 71 coordinating projects, 1290 cooperating centers and 
23 universities based on the US land grant model and 20,000 scientists in sub-fields as 
diverse as extension, soil science, agricultural chemistry, microbiology and entomology 
(Nehru, 1989). This portrayal of the Green Revolution as a complete success in 
mainstream national and global food security discourses would allow policies in the 
decades that ensued to recognize the use of technology as the sole means of achieving 
food requirements, no matter what the cost. This macro level perspective that would be 
reinforced over the next half-century not only reduced allocations of resources dedicated 
towards alternative practices, but also led to their marginalization and delegitimization in 
the eyes of the newer generation of farmers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Chapter IV: The consolidation of technocracy with the penetration of market 
relations  
 
Even as the Green Revolution was for the most part perceived as an unqualified 
success in top-down international and national societal discourse, which as mentioned 
would greatly influence the preeminence of technological innovation and productivist 
logic in structuring global agricultural policies, disaggregating the phenomenon’s claim 
in achieving record yields and reducing hunger would illuminate critical perspectives that 
complicate its supposed achievements. For example, in the very same year of the initial 
success in many parts of “East India, one could not move about in the countryside 
without hearing people at or near the base of the rural hierarchy expressing their 
frustration concerning their status and economic vulnerability” (Januzzi, 1994, 140). 
There were instances “involving peasant cultivators in land-grab activities [and] most 
militant expressions were localized around the Naxalbari in West Bengal” (Januzzi, 1994, 
141), which subsequently turned into a Communist guerilla movement that has remained 
active till today. Even Prime Minister Indira Gandhi whose economic philosophy was 
similar to her father, Prime Minister Nehru “in August 1969, suggested that small farmers 
had not been sharing meaningfully in whatever progress had been generated [and] urged 
[provincial level] chief ministers that a fair share of fertilizer, seeds and irrigation be 
guaranteed to cultivators tilling smallholdings [as well as to] confer security of tenure 
[and] quick[ly] implement [land] ceiling” (Januzzi, 1994, 143). These negative impacts 
were conveniently ignored given that it was expedient to believe that an even greater 
uptake of technology resulting in even greater productivity and production levels would 
bring about increased incomes for all and that social unrest would eventually eliminated.  
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However, given that Green Revolution technologies are heavily premised on high 
levels of upfront capital, only rich farmers were initially able to afford to purchase these 
inputs. Unsurprisingly, “poorer, peasant farmers were priced out of the market, the 
concentration of landholding increased,” a situation that would in part catalyze rural-
urban migration and create the country’s massive informal sector. Furthermore, what 
would exacerbate this trend was that “large landholders discover[ed] that even though 
high-yielding varieties required more expensive inputs, their higher profit margins 
enabled them to invest in labor-saving machinery and chemicals” (Latham, 2011, 117). 
These two trends importantly highlight the self-fulfilling rather than inevitable character 
of the Rostowian idea of moving of populations out of the agricultural sector. 
With the truth regime of the necessity of technological use increasingly solidified 
amongst many agricultural stakeholders, small farmers would have little choice but to 
remain competitive. This would be a daunting task given that “the new agricultural 
technology is essentially land-saving and to some extent labor-saving. There is a 
substitution of capital for land and labor” (Hanumantha, 1994, 12). This resulted over 
time in the weakening or even disappearance of the traditionally observed inverse 
relationship between farm size and output per hectare. In effect, the increase in “the yield 
per hectare of certain individual crops through the intensification of inputs [and] labor 
displacing mechanization like harvest combines [would have] an adverse effect on the 
employment and income of hired labor whose number ha[d] been increasing and getting 
increasingly casualised” (Hanumantha, 1994, 45-46). Rather than address these 
increasing disparities between large and small farmers by redistribution (in terms of land 
or otherwise), de-emphasizing market production, or critically evaluating the 
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appropriateness of the technologically-centric paradigm, the idea of competition would 
gain axiomatic truth value and would be increasingly strengthened. This was not only 
justified with well-known contemporary tropes of economic efficiency and the purported 
benefits of low food prices for society at large, but also consisted of what ultimately 
would become naturalized discourses of self-responsibilization and individualization. 
Instead of raising questions regarding an alternative structural environment, more and 
more farmers internalized its seeming natural character and looked to adjusting their own 
behavior and decision-making capacity in order to succeed in the new reality of a 
competitive framework.        
Hence, for small farmers to afford input technologies to attempt to keep up with a 
drastically altered production environment, it would be necessary for them to take on 
credit, indicating the beginning of vicious cycles of debt that many still are entrenched in 
today. Initially, government policies played a central role in catalyzing the introduction of 
credit structures into rural life. The decade of the 1970s would constitute the start of 
massive expansion of credit availability firstly through formal banking and subsequently 
through informal mechanisms such as microfinance institutions, cooperative credit and 
self-help groups with deregulation of the financial sector. It is important to emphasize 
credit’s role around the time of India’s independence was minimal given that in 1955, the 
nationalization of “the new State Bank of India (SBI) [only led to the] open[ing of] 400 
branches in semi-urban areas [to] start agricultural lending, even if at a loss. Even so, 
right up to 1971, the share of banks in rural credit was no more than 2.4 percent and most 
of these loans were given to plantations” (Shah et al, 2007, 1353). It was in 1969 when 
“fourteen of India's largest scheduled commercial banks were nationalized. [with] the 
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preamble [of the relevant legislation, the] Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer 
of Undertakings) Act, 1969 [stating that its goal encompassed] ‘a larger social purpose 
and the need to ‘subserve national priorities and objectives such as rapid growth of 
agriculture, small industries and exports, raising of employment levels, encouragement of 
new entrepreneurs and development of backward areas’” (emphasis mine). This framing 
already presupposes that societal betterment and progress necessarily required a growing 
wage economy and which would be catalyzed by exogenous technical applications, 
financed by debt contracts. In addition, it would mark an implicit claim that technological 
use would inevitably displace agricultural labor and that new economic sectors would 
have to be established to absorb these populations.  
Given the constant reinforcement of this dominant logic of technical change 
lubricated with cheap and widely available liquidity, it is unsurprising that “the number 
of rural branches of banks increased from a mere 1443 in 1969 to around 35,000 in the 
early 1990s [and] the share of rural branches went up from 18 to 58 per cent during the 
same period” (Shah et al, 2007, 1354). Initially, with both the availability of high levels 
of relatively cheap credit as well as provision of public resources for agricultural 
investment, a measure of legitimacy thrived, both on the level of a somewhat stable 
overall social contract between government and farmers as well as in terms of the 
perception of the potential positive outcomes of the focus on quantity of production in 
some parts of the country. Hence into the 1970s, a higher proportion of rural communities 
were swept by Green Revolution technologies and its truth regimes of the necessity of 
market-based production that came with an illusion that access to credit at low interest 
rates could be sustained in the long-term. Over the years, as the desirability of wealth 
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accumulation began to intensify amongst a wide swath of the rural poor, it would first 
require a significant reorientation of how the socio-economic context would come to be 
perceived, namely by commodifying individual and community possessions (which could 
act as collateral) and altering production practices towards the repayment of debts, with 
the hope that stable market prices would allow for increasing incomes to be acquired.  
Subsequent withdrawal of state involvement in agriculture  
These ingrained truth regimes of capital and technology-intensive agricultural 
production and the entrepreneurial individual farmer would be sustained despite the 
subsequent rollback starting in the mid-1980s of direct state involvement in the 
agricultural sector and the accompanying deregulation of financial institutions that would 
alter the institutional and policy framework to one that remains hegemonic today. Similar 
to the externally derived neutral ideas surrounding the assumed necessity of 
technological innovation to improve agriculture, the emergence of fiscal discipline and 
state withdrawal from economic production can be traced to the reemergence of the 
discourse that desires to remove so-called distortions from the smooth functioning of the 
free market.  
Again, rather than being a timeless and scientific set of ideas that transpired 
necessarily and teleologically, it only became prominent after a series of political 
contestations internationally displaced the New Left wherein counterculture, civil rights, 
anti-war, student and environmental movements in the United States and Europe bore 
affinities with Marxist-inspired labor and postcolonial movements in newly-independent 
nation-states had attempted imagine a radically new world economic order. Globally, this 
would mark the beginning of the neoliberal era with the impotency of Non-Aligned 
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Movement and flailing promises of the 1955 Bandung Conference to establish economic 
policies in newly-independent countries that did not necessarily emphasize integration 
with the wider (capitalist) global economy structured around American and European 
interests. Unsurprisingly, key actors who propagated these ideas were the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), institutions based in Washington DC. Many 
of these countries became mired in debt, due in part to poorly executed capital-intensive 
import-substitution policies, the reluctance of Global North governments to disburse 
untied foreign aid and wider external forces beyond the control of much of the Global 
South. The latter include the relinquishment of the Gold standard--replaced by US dollar 
as the de facto reserve currency, declining terms of trade, the Volcker shock of the mid-
1970s leading to the rise in global interest rates, the creation of the G7 that allowed the 
world’s most power countries to consolidate its hegemony especially in terms of its 
efforts at delegitimizing the New International Economic Order (NIEO)1 proposed at the 
UN General Assembly and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and the failure in the enactment of proposed arrangements to use oil revenues from OPEC 
states for productive investments in Global South countries and exacerbated by the oil 
crisis of the 1970s. (Prashad, 2012). As a result, they were forced to take on loans from 
these two institutions that came with a number of conditionalities that demanded 
economic restructuring towards a more market-friendly orientation. These pressures were 
present in India as early as the lead-up to the Green Revolution, but were resisted by 
high-level government officials who initially saw them as a form of neocolonial 
meddling.  
                                               
1
 setting up of commodity associations, allowing national regulation of multinational corporations, ensuring equitable terms of trade 
and unconditional technology transfers and technical assistance from Global North to Global South 
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A report, published by the World Bank that chronicles the relationship between 
the institution and the Indian government from 1947-1997 by one of its staff members. It 
documented how initially in the early post-independence years, “Indian decision-makers 
saw the Bank as a source of capital rather than of advice. The ideological perspective 
attributed to the Bank made it unlikely that the Bank would be able to offer relevant 
advice” (Kraske, 1997, 2). However, this perception shifted over the years as a dialectical 
back and forth proceeded. In the context of high expenditures of state investments in the 
industrial sector, “the Bank mounted a large economic mission in the fall of 1964 which 
was headed by Bernard Bell, a seasoned professional and highly regarded economic 
consultant based upon the objective idea that rising fiscal pressures would weaken the 
country’s growth potential. The resulting report was described by Kraske as 
“undoctrinaire and matter-of-fact, [criticizing how] heavy reliance on import substitution 
and the extended role of the public sector [would lead to] the neglect of exports and 
pervasive inefficiency.” Similar to the Green Revolution seminal moment in which 
technocratic abstractions of scientific rationality gained significant legitimacy to justify 
external interventions to improve backward agriculture, the report’s emphasis on 
understanding perceived to be  real “failures, deficiencies, and obstacles to more rapid 
progress in order that they might be overcome, that the achievements might be greater, 
and that progress might be accelerated” (Kraske, 1997, 10) highlights how World Bank 
efforts were characterized as a dispassionate exercise in assessing India’s economy based 
on a universal set of abstract economic theories.  
With this non-ideological framing coupled with the context of “India’s foreign 
exchange reserves plummet[ing] to US$500 million from a high of US$1.87 billion a 
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decade earlier” (Kirk, 2011, 16), a US$900 million loan was accepted by the Indian 
government, on the condition of a devaluation of its currency by 36.5%. Significantly, it 
marked the World Bank’s “first significant attempt to use the leverage of its lending to 
modify macroeconomic policies in a major member country” (Kraske, 1997, 12) beyond 
infrastructural financial assistance, marking a key test of the purported scienticity and 
non-ideological character on which it was justified. The promises of expanded economic 
growth on the basis of this early version of neoliberal doctrine did not materialize in the 
years thereafter, “sour[ing] the relationship with its most important borrower” (Kraske, 
1997, 13). In response, Prime Minister “Gandhi abandon[ed] the reform program 
negotiated with the Bank--apart from agricultural sector components--and instead 
launch[ed] an aggressive expansion of the public sector including new licensing 
requirements and other restrictions for industry and nationalizing the country’s major 
banks” (Kirk, 2011, 20). The World Bank fended off criticism of the ineffectiveness of 
the policy’s promises by casting blame back on the Indian state by stating that “extent of 
the reforms introduced [was not] significant enough to have brought about a major 
transformation of the economy” (Kraske, 1997, 12) dictated that the complexity of 
actually existing society conform to its presupposed universal context-less principles. 
Similar to how a healthy level of ambivalence and skepticism with regards to the 
suitability of agricultural technology finally gave way to a more-or-less acceptance of its 
purported superior quality, initial resentment against World Bank/IMF prescriptions 
would eventually disappear as structural reforms gained domestic legitimacy, especially 
at the central government level. 
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Hence, the failure of this first attempt at enforcing neoliberal orthodoxy would 
only be temporary especially in the context of increasing capital needs for agricultural 
technologies (and industry) as just alluded to and the resulting fiscal and current account 
pressures that would be magnified into the late 1980s. Interestingly, the World Bank 
under the presidency of “[Robert] McNamara [beginning] in 1968 downplayed reform 
advocacy in favor of meeting expanded lending targets. The Bank became much more 
focused on targeted poverty reduction, [with this] norm le[ading] to a 1970s emphasis on 
new kinds of projects [doubtless in a technocratic manner], focusing on agriculture and 
rural development, family planning and the social sectors of primary education and 
health” (Kirk, 2011, 22-23). As a result, this alignment with modernization theory 
catalyzed “lending for major irrigation schemes, for agricultural credit supporting 
groundwater irrigation and agricultural mechanization, for seed propagation, grain 
storage, agricultural markets and rural electrification, [which in totality] represented an 
expanding share of the Bank's activities in India, absorbing close to 40% of total 
commitments by the mid-1970s” (Kirk, 2011, 13). Thus, it gave rise to a dynamic of 
mutual dependence, similar to intractable creditor-debtor relationships witnessed at the 
level of the individual farmer with the World Bank needing to remain relevant and hence 
“occasionally voiced internal concerns about India’s economic policies [did not prevent] 
the Bank [from] expanding its portfolio” (Kirk, 2011, 27). Domestically, the continued 
push led to a “growth of spending accelerat[ing] from 13% annually in the 1970s to 
almost 19% in the 1980s. The resulting deficits were funded by domestic and foreign 
borrowing, raising the level of debt servic[ing] in the budget to alarming levels and 
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quadrupling India's foreign debt from $20 billion in 1980 to $80 billion in 1991” (Kraske, 
2011, 18). 
Eventually, as these debts continued to mount, the ideological tides at the World 
Bank and IMF shifted into the 1980s towards monetarism that emphasized financial 
discipline. “Jácques de Larosière, a hard-nosed former undersecretary for monetary 
affairs at the Directeur du Tresor and head of the Banque de France [took over at the 
IMF]. De Larosière had no time for equity and the NIEO. He was given over to the 
monetarist view that stability was the main order [while] Tom Clausen, straight from his 
perch at BankAmerica” (Prashad, 2012, 29-30) became the president of the World Bank 
in 1981. At the same time, a similar trend was happening internally at the higher echelons 
of the Indian central government. It is noted that “especially during [Prime Minister] 
Gandhi’s second, post-Emergency tenure in 1980-4, [she] began to listen more to the 
advice of reform advocates in her government, decreas[ing] public expenditure and 
liberalized import restrictions, albeit modestly” (Kirk, 2011, 24). Thus, it was during this 
time when the political and bureaucratic elite began to willingly accept the validity of the 
supposed universal truth claims of economic abstraction coming from the World 
Bank/IMF. A contemporary manifestation of this is “the ‘revolving door’ linking senior 
economic posts in New Delhi to the Bretton Woods institutions in Washington as typified 
in the careers of officials such as Montek Singh Ahluwalia and Shankar Acharya” (Kirk, 
2011, xix) and the fact that “the Bank’s offices in New Delhi employ almost 200 
professional staff [with] over 90% of them are Indian, including senior economist 
positions and other top jobs--suggesting a significant “indigenization” of the institution’s 
country operations” (Kirk, 2011, xx).  
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While it is might be justified to argue that massive growing fiscal debts cannot be 
sustained ad infinitum (which in itself showing the folly of basing an economic paradigm 
on capital-intensive technology, subsequently necessitating some degree of subsequent 
pull-back), the considerable extent of structural reforms India took was a result of central 
government officials internalizing the wider discourse of “economic and financial 
realities [and] lack of financial discipline.” Coupled with “analytical work of the Bank 
contribut[ing] to this debate and helped clarify the issues” (Kraske, 1997, 19), the 
emergence of the truth regime of cuts in government spending, the idea of the infallibility 
of the terms of debt contracts and the deregulation of the private sector would come to 
dominate the mindsets of those who are in positions of economic policymaking starting 
the late 1980s until today. It was partially on this basis that justified the key moment in 
India’s liberalization policies starting in 1990-1, when the country 
“experienced a severe balance of payments crisis….[F]undamentally, analysts have 
argued that the crisis stemmed from structural imbalances and unsustainable policies, 
including large current account deficits throughout the 1980s and a rapid accumulation of 
foreign debt, accompanied by a deterioration in the quality of debt as current government 
expenditures rose and public investment fell. India’s foreign exchange reserves fell to 
alarmingly low levels and the government’s credit rating was downgraded. In July 1991, 
India sought stabilization assistance worth US$2.3 billion from the IMF, followed by its 
first [structural adjustment loan] from the World Bank in the amount of US$500 million” 
(Kirk, 2011, 27-28). 
 
Specifically in agricultural sector, even as the loss in traditional knowledge and 
weakening of the moral economy was already in full swing, the commitment to capital-
intensive technological innovations continued to be reinforced at this juncture. The only, 
but significant change was the question of who was going to provide these resources, 
which also had distributional implications.  
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Clear evidence of reforms can be seen from how, “from 1985 to 1990—on 
average a sizeable 11.1 percent of NNP [(net national product)] was allocated annually to 
rural development expenditure (RDE) and infrastructure. [This figure] was cut sharply to 
below 6 percent by mid-decade” (Patnaik, 2005, 234). In absolute terms, “public 
investment in agriculture declined slightly in nominal terms from Rs 4395 crores (1990-
91) to Rs 4221 crores (1999-00). A look at total investment as a share of GDP is more 
revealing-it fell from 1.92% to 1.37%” (Vakulabharanam and Motiram, 2011, 111-112) 
in an economy that grew in absolute terms or “shr[inking] from 17% in the 1970s to 12% 
in the 1980s to just 9% in the 1990s as a proportion of total investment in the economy” 
(Shrivastava and Kothari, 2012, 178). In addition, “average tariffs on agricultural imports 
[were] reduced from 100% in 1990 to 30% in 1997” (Vakulabharanam and Motiram, 
2011, 114), exposing small farmers to greater competition.  
The deregulation of the banking sector would also contribute to negative 
consequences small farmers came to face as a result of state rollback, giving rise to an 
even greater extent of exploitative debt relations as “the expansion of the formal credit 
sector, even [as credit disbursal during] the period of social banking showed a great 
imbalance, being concentrated in the hands of the rich and the already developed regions” 
(Shah et al, 2007, 1356). Given that agricultural technology was becoming used by more 
small farmers at ever greater intensity, “a neoliberal ethos governing the provision of 
credit was rapidly established within key institutions such as the RBI and the National 
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD)” (Taylor, 2011, 486-487) 
would place farmers in greater precarity.  
“The RBI set up a Committee on the Financial System in 1991. Th[is] Narasimham 
Committee placed its report centrally within the broader process of "liberalisation" of the 
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Indian economy….It wanted the branch licensing policy to be revoked and interest rates 
to be deregulated. The share of [branch] offices in total bank branches peaked in 1990 (58 
per cent) and steadily declined thereafter to under 45 per cent in 2006….Mergers and 
swapping of rural branches, rather than expansion, became the norm” (Shah et al, 2007, 
1356).  
 
With this decreased presence of public banks, it would come as no surprise that “private 
banks increased their share in both credit and deposits from around 4 per cent in each in 
1990 to around 18-19 per cent in each in 2005” (Shah et al, 2007, 1357). 
As a result, the entrance of non-institutional microfinance came to fill in for the 
credit needs of small farmers. This would mainly take the form of self-help groups 
(SHGs), which not only consists of collectives saving money and loaning it back out, but 
would eventually involve their “eligib[ility] for small loan[s] from a commercial bank. 
Linking SHGs to banks was seen to facilitate their integration into the formal financial 
system despite a lack of collateral” (Taylor, 2011, 488). What “began as a pilot in 1992 
with 500 [such] groups [expanded to] over 22,000,000 SHGs ha[ving] been provided 
with bank loans by March 2006” (Shah et al, 2007, 1358). Given the profit-maximization 
nature of commercial bank operations, coupled with relatively small disbursement 
amounts of these loans, the need for these groups to remain financially viable would 
require the imposition of high interest rates. It would come as no surprise that “private 
banks have increased their share in both credit and deposits from around 4 per cent in 
each in 1990 to around 18-19 per cent in each in 2005” (Shah et al, 2007, 1357).  
In addition to how “poor producers [have come to] rely on non-institutional 
sources where interest rates average 28%” (Harriss-White and Janakarajan, 1997, 1473), 
the trapping of small farmers in vicious cycles of debt would be sustained on the basis of 
new forms of bondage, including “future labor service, future harvest or the right to use 
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already encumbered land. The lender is in a powerful position to undervalue these not 
easily marketable collaterals [to the extent of the] prefer[ring] default to repayment” 
(Shah et al, 2007, 1361), thus having an interest in perpetually entrapping small farmers 
in such relations and allowing them to maximize the extraction of surplus value on the 
basis of their weak bargaining position. With the decreasing ability of reliance on 
traditional production methods and the breakdown of the moral economy, there exist few 
possibilities to maneuver in order to escape these logics. Furthermore, what makes this 
even unlikelier to occur is how small farmers have internalized the discourse of 
individualization and the resulting seemingly rational, but atomistic and powerless 
interaction with upstream and downstream agricultural market structures and its 
mechanistic dictates.  
This dominant technocratic and market discourse on agriculture would result in a 
number of other vicious cycles including change in production trends, the emergence of 
the technological treadmill and the manifestation of negative ecological consequences. At 
a basic level, given that “land, harvests, labor time and natural resources [increasingly] 
are monetarily evaluated while surrounding sociocultural and ecological considerations 
remain secondary” (Gerber, 2014, 738), the instrumentalist character of both social and 
human-nature relationships only become reinforced. At the same time, with the passing 
of two generations since India’s independence, traditional knowledge loss on both the 
level of production practices and cultural meanings would become more pronounced, 
exemplified by the “area under high-yielding varieties of foodgrains ha[ving] risen from 
2 million hectares in 1966-7 to 61 million hectares in 1989-90, [whilst] the consumption 
of fertilizer, which had risen from 66 thousand tonnes in 1951-52 to 785 thousand tonnes 
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in 1965-6, rose to 12.5 million tonnes in 1990” (Hanumantha, 1994, 13). While part of 
this increase can be attributed to the desire to increase yields, the short-termist production 
mentality and the declining health of land would result in heightened monocropping, 
prevalence of diminishing returns due to chemical effectiveness, increased pest resistance 
as well as reduced availability and use of organic manures. 
As a consequence of this relentless exploitation driven by the need to maximize 
short-term production to stay competitive, production practices became untethered from 
ecological realities. This is typified by how 
“some 20 million wells currently source water for almost 60% of India’s net irrigated 
area, ma[king] India the biggest user of groundwater globally. The attractiveness of 
groundwater irrigation lay precisely in its potential to sever agricultural production from 
the fickleness of the monsoon rains. The possibility of ‘water on demand’ provided 
hydrological foundations for a greater intensity of production through year-round 
cultivation, the diversification of crops and increased technological change across both 
production and processing” (Taylor, 2013, 694-695). 
 
This paradigm perceives nature as merely possessing useful resources that could be 
constantly extracted for cash crop (commodity) production. At a basic ecological level, 
we can recognize the folly of how scientific management of agricultural production is 
structured in terms of discrete, linear processes in an effort to maximize output is 
something that cannot be sustained into the long-term.  
With both the market logic increasingly becoming hegemonic, rampant 
competition would only lead to self-exploitation (a form of indirect extraction of surplus 
value or subsidy for downstream agricultural stakeholders and better-off consumers in 
India and beyond) amongst many small farmers as they attempt to escape debt cycles in 
light of “their exposure to steeply falling global primary prices since mid-decade” 
(Patnaik, 2005, 238-239). The already dire situation would be exacerbated by “average 
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real costs per hectare hav[ing] more than doubled since 1973-74 [to 2004 with] the 
biggest change over the period is the share of costs taken by pesticides; up from 1% to 
11%” (Harriss-White et al, 2004, 24). An additional factor that would aggravate the 
plight of the smallholder would be how “large farmers were far more likely to invest 
[credit] productively [whilst small farmers] used the money for meeting basic 
consumption needs or paying existing debts” (Taylor, 2011, 499), highlighting how the 
worsening economic, social and ecological context is dialectically self-reinforcing. 
Even as the necessity of smallholders in acquiescing to taking on debt to remain 
competitive in order to reproduce basic livelihoods is acknowledged, it is also important 
to recognize the significance of the positive representation of credit relations in societal 
discourse in India and around the world. Rather than being a mere catalyst for the 
possible accumulation of wealth, it also serves an “ideological function as a context-free 
development tool that can be evaluated on the basis of its own internal logic in 
abstraction from any place-bound conjuncture of social, political and ecological 
relations” (Taylor, 2012, 602). This truth regime is implicitly accompanied by moralizing 
tendencies that associate good behavior with the fulfillment of contractual debt 
obligations. The transactional characteristics of these arrangements that desires to 
explicitly extricate societal context, circumstances and power differentials have 
interesting parallels with the role of debt during pre-capitalist times both in India and 
beyond, exposing the illusion of purported freedom (to contract) associated with the 
modern market framework. David Graeber’s book Debt: The First 5000 Years contrary to 
dominant economic history narratives, interrogates how debt structures were present in 
modes of exchange throughout human history. In many of those instances, debt was tied 
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up explicitly with culturally specific notions of reciprocity, guilt, redemption, morality 
and sin. Hence, the characterization of modern day debt relations as mutually agreed 
contracts, devoid of the influence of self-interest, cultural values and social hierarchies 
itself highlights its ideological character. In actuality, this illusion of neutrality (with 
many resigning to acquiesce to this naturalized societal phenomenon) hides how “once an 
economic actor has entered an interest-bearing and guarantee-based credit contract, 
he/she is compelled to think and to behave in a particular way in order to secure timely 
repayments [and hence,] forced to produce commodities” (Gerber, 2014, 737-738). This 
disciplining effect molds a “calculating, rational and maximizing character” in what 
Michel Foucault would characterize in his 1978-79 lectures compiled in The Birth of 
Biopolitics as entrepreneurial self-production with the remaking of the human as homo 
economicus (Foucault and Senellart, 2008). The individual, especially one who is in debt 
would come to structure everyday life around the generation of monetary value and 
constantly make production decisions using “cost/benefit evaluation of all economic 
transactions and resources, based on the current market prices [resulting in a] relentless 
drive to concentrate, invest, grow and expand market dependence” (Gerber, 2014, 737-
738) in an effort to escape vicious debt cycles. It assumes that humans naturally have 
“values compatible with profit generation, namely the ability to calculate, to work hard, 
[and] to fit into market institutions” (Gerber, 2014, 744). Any instance of failure is seen 
as an inevitable consequence of the axiom of market competition, placing blame at the 
individual level for one’s inability in being efficient and productive.  
As a result of the combination of the rise in the logic of competition, increased 
input prices, reduction in state support, negative environmental impacts, stagnant output 
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prices and decreased access to institutional credit, it would come as no surprise that the 
smallholder agrarian crisis would emerge into the 2000s till today. Despite an increased 
cash crop focus, “the share of agriculture in real GDP declined from 31.6% to 26.8% 
during 1987-99 [which has further decreased since then], while the work force remained 
at 64 to 65%” (Eashvaraiah, 335, 2001). Even as absolute production increased, the 
“growth rate for agriculture [was only] 2 percent per annum during the decade from 1995 
to 2005, a much lower average than in the 1980s when agricultural growth averaged 3.33 
percent and, in fact, it represents the lowest level of growth since independence” (Walker, 
2008, 575), highlighting longstanding trends of unremunerative prices and unfair terms of 
trade. In this sense, the current situation facing small farmers highlights the inability of 
the abstracted logic inherent in the theoretical edifice of both state-led developmentalism 
and neoliberal doctrine to bring livelihood stability to a majority of India’s population 
who remain involved in small-scale agriculture. However, it is the partially the failure of 
the former paradigm in presupposing that capital requirements of technology could be 
provided in large part by the state that led to the latter’s legitimacy as the notion of the 
desirability of using technology itself is no longer much of a point of controversy at least 
in general mainstream societal discourse. The power differentials and exploitative 
dependency relationships that would emerge to a much larger extent with greater market 
and export-oriented production would be glossed over by the discursive romanticization 
of the merits of purported mutually beneficial effects resulting from flows of capital, 
knowledge and goods.  
With the central government and the two main political parties (the BJP and the 
Congress) committed for the most part to the basic tenets of the abstracted logic of 
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technological innovation and neoliberal economic doctrine and with associated India-
wide policy guidance (especially in terms of the emergence of a highly centralized elite 
bureaucracy) far removed from the complex situation occurring at the subnational level, 
it comes as no surprise that the dominant framework, naturalized over the last half 
century or so is able to continue to sustain its legitimacy. This double abstraction would 
come to pinpoint the causes of adverse impacts either by largely assigning blame on the 
“inability of the cultivators to have used appropriate knowledge and skills of the new 
commercial inputs” (Vasavi, 2009, 99). It also ties into the idea of technological 
innovation as an unending progressivist process with its products always able to be 
adopted unproblematically in local contexts. This idea itself is a contextless 
generalization that does not take into account challenging agroecological conditions in 
dryland agriculture, especially on the Deccan plateau. To some extent, this (un)willing 
acceptance by small farmers of structural conditions is deeply intertwined with societal 
discourses of betterment assumed to be achievable through the further realization of the 
technological frontier, individual responsibilization and the need to eliminate persistent 
distortions in the naturally existing free market. 
As a result, the current discursive, infrastructural and institutional framework 
continues to be shaped by a reinforcement of the perceived apolitical character of what is 
the intertwined theoretical edifice of technological prowess and neoliberal economic 
doctrine. Hence, it is the prevailing framing of issues of agricultural production as 
technical problems with the use of seemingly neutral descriptions and representations 
that allows any noted negative effects to be explained away. For example, a noted social 
commentator claims that “increase in [yield] instability cannot be attributed to the new 
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technology. Rather, the instability arises from the adverse agro-climatic conditions in 
which the technology is used” (Hanumantha, 1994, 24) whilst “for the state government 
and the World Bank, the source of problems [of inefficient water use] can be variously 
located in an ineffective regulatory structure, in market distortions created by the 
provision of subsidized electricity, and in information deficits that prohibit farmers from 
making rational decisions” (Taylor, 2013, 692).  
This facet of not questioning epistemological assumptions inherent in the 
dominant framework is most salient in how the causes of farmer suicides are ascertained, 
an emerging trend of the last decade or so, with “at least 200,000 farmers hav[ing] killed 
themselves around the country over 13 years up to 2010” (Shrivastava and Kothari, 2012, 
179). As opposed to interrogating structural inequities and policy failures that render 
smallholder livelihood reproduction difficult, focus is placed on “the socio-behavioral 
practices among farmers, the prevalence of alcoholism, poor health conditions, the 
occurrence of family disputes over property [in that] suicides reflect a breakdown of 
family and traditional ties as well as of psychological conditions of predisposition to 
depression” (Hebbar, 2010, 96). By grasping rural poverty as a natural societal 
phenomenon, “proposed solutions predictably have been reformist and welfare-based in 
nature and [for the most part] clearly shift[s] the onus onto the farmers themselves for 
alcoholism, domestic discord and debt” (Hebbar, 2010, 97). These explanations that only 
serve to reinforce the idea of individual responsibilization highlight the double-edged 
sword inherent in the overwhelmingly positive tropes associated with the myth of the 
self-made entrepreneurial farmer. 
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Chapter V: The continued top-down narrow framing of agricultural policies today  
 
Unsurprisingly, with the technocratic paradigm remaining resilient, policy 
guidance in the last decade coming from not only the World Bank, but also from the 
Indian central government largely frames the future of agricultural production as one that 
remains committed to the prevailing approach. For the World Bank, it continues to 
emphasize the incomplete project of structural reform and access to credit, in that it 
assumes that only when such policies are fully implemented, will production conditions 
automatically allow for a wider swath of the farmer population to thrive. The 2004 World 
Bank Report titled India: Re-energizing the Agricultural Sector To Sustain Growth and 
Reduce Poverty explicitly identifies the following set of recommendations:    
“(a) liberalizing and improving the functioning of commodity markets, (b) reforming 
commodity price policy, (c) rationalizing input subsidies, (d) increasing productivity-
enhancing investments (research and development, extension, rural infrastructure and 
services) and (e) reforming public sector institutions and adopting participatory 
approaches” (World Bank, 2004, ix). 
 
At one go, it identifies (and hence criticizes) the problem of state involvement as 
wasteful, which prevents the power and potential of unhindered markets to bring about 
rural prosperity through income generation. This unreflexive sentiment remained present 
four years later in the 2008 World Bank Report, India: Taking Agriculture to Market 
when it discusses not only the incompleteness of the penetration of credit and the 
ineffective and dysfunctional public extension system, but also supposed win-win 
possibilities that would come with further deregulation, promotion of competition and 
withdrawal of the state, assuming that increased individual choice and resulting growth 
will occur and will benefit all.   
“Removing policy and regulatory barriers so that those who choose to remain in 
agriculture can enhance their productivity and competitiveness and achieve the highest 
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returns from their endeavors is critical for maximizing the agricultural sector’s 
contribution to overall economic growth...growth in the rural nonfarm sector (industry 
and services) will not only offer alternative employment opportunities but will create a 
strong foundation for consumer demand in rural areas” (World Bank, 2008, xi-xiii) 
 
 It is telling that the developmentalist logic of moving populations out of 
agriculture appears explicitly in this report with its presupposition of those that remain in 
agriculture should do so on the basis of contributing as much as possible to the creation 
of monetary value. In addition, this notion serves as another mode of cushioning the 
critique of the existing production paradigm, in that it makes a normative claim that those 
who are unable to compete within the market logic should necessarily move out of 
agriculture as a means to reproduce their livelihoods. This view is further reiterated in the 
2014 World Bank Report, India: Accelerating Agricultural Productivity Growth 2014, in 
its hard-hitting approach towards the castigating perennial deficiencies in the Indian 
government policy framework for not liberalizing far enough to its abstracted ideal whilst 
also criticizing the perceived low productivity of the small farmer. 
“For the vast population that still derives a living directly or indirectly from agriculture, 
achieving “faster, more inclusive, and sustainable growth”—the objectives at the heart of 
the Twelfth Five Year Plan—depends critically on simultaneous efforts to improve 
agriculture’s performance and develop new sources of employment for the 
disproportionately large share of the labor force still on the farm….the slow pace of 
India’s structural transformation is reflected in the large gap in productivity between 
agricultural and nonagricultural workers. The low productivity of a large proportion of 
the labor force places a heavy tax on overall well-being and shared prosperity…. 
Consequently, India must pay particular attention to accelerating the pace of labor 
absorption outside of agriculture, and it must redouble efforts to increase labor 
productivity within agriculture” (World Bank, 2014, xv-xix). 
 
 It is this characterization of the individual small farmer who is unable to be 
productive in terms of both economic value and yield figures that sustains the notion of 
inefficiency. However, this discourse that reinforces entrepreneurial responsibilization 
does not consider the contextual production constraints (ecological situation, 
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differentiated access to capital, etc.), signifying the latest iteration of the trope of the 
incapable farmer who must adopt external technologies to become better producers 
(Kumar, 2014). It also assumes of the complete commensurability between goods in the 
agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector, in that it reduces the worth of 
qualitatively different products to a fungible monetary value. It will come as no surprise 
the Indian central government supports the adoption of the latest in technology, 
emphasizing the need to continue to increase yields and democratizing access to 
information (i.e. technical knowledge, market conditions, etc.) as enumerated in its 
Agricultural Policy: Vision 2020. It states that  
“the future increase in food production to meet the continuing high demand must come 
from increase in yield. There is a need to strengthen adaptive research and technology 
assessment, refinement and transfer capabilities of the country so that the existing wide 
technology transfer gaps are bridged. For this, an appropriate network of extension 
service needs to be created to stimulate and encourage both top-down and bottom-up 
flows of information between farmers, extension workers, and research scientists to 
promote the generation, adoption, and evaluation of location specific farm technologies. 
Ample scope exists for increasing genetic yield potential of a large number of vegetables, 
fruits as well as other food crops and livestock and fisheries products” (IARI, 2006, 4). 
 
Not only does the central government not acknowledge the dominant highly capital and 
technology-intensive paradigm as a potential source of currently existing problems, it 
redoubles its commitment to such a productivist framework, assuming that ever 
increasing technological advances and the expansion of market opportunities will 
automatically lead to sustained prosperity for small farmers. It would comprise of not 
only “creating agriculture-based rural agro-processing and agro-industries, improved 
rural infrastructures, including access to information, and effective markets [and] farm to 
market roads (IARI, 2006, 10) and “post-harvest handling and agroprocessing and value 
addition technologies” (IARI, 2006, 8), but also initiatives in using the latest 
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developments in information science such as “remote sensing and GIS technologies. [The 
corresponding] mapp[ing] at micro and macro levels [of] natural and other agricultural 
resource[s would lead to better] land and water use planning as well as agricultural 
forecasting, market intelligence and e-business, contingency planning and prediction of 
disease and pest incidences” (IARI, 2006, 14). This latest move to further abstract reality 
through mathematical calculations of even greater complexity continues to assume that 
production outcomes can be largely be determined with a rational assessment of inputs 
and its interaction with the materiality of the land on which production takes place.  
This fetishization of the latest high-tech tools not only reinforces a technological 
frontier mentality that frames existing solutions as merely technical in character, easily 
casting aside the characterization of agricultural systems as a complex entanglement of 
social, ecological and technical knowledges, systems, infrastructures and ideas that 
cannot be completely apprehended using scientific concepts. The rigid application of 
these instrumental skills embedded in external scientific knowledges is assumed to then 
spontaneously lead to increased well-being through increased incomes with increased 
market interaction. Rather than acknowledge the relevance of contextual non-scientific 
factors in influencing production practices, the dominant technocratic paradigm suggests 
that only through “specific human resource and skill development programmes to train 
[small farmers] will make them better decision-makers and highly productive” (IARI, 
2006, 12). 
 Unsurprisingly, the World Bank has been a huge proponent of this value-chain 
and information-centric push since the early 2000s, assuming that small farmers can 
smoothly be integrated into larger scale agricultural markets. Largely, it continues to 
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frame currently existing problems as mainly stemming from a highly regulated 
“agricultural marketing system remain[ing] fragmented and uncoordinated, subject to 
multiple layers of intermediaries, with markets that have inadequate infrastructure and 
facilities, and supply chains subject to high wastage and losses” (World Bank, 2008, ix). 
This market is framed as an entity that not only exists naturally, but also, the basis of its 
logic of production is also posited to align unproblematically with the operation of socio-
technical-economic systems it is embedded in and depends on. This discourse frames 
existing (ecological) problems as stemming from the “distort[ion of] farmer incentives 
[through] foodgrain, fertilizer, power, and irrigation subsidies increasingly eroding the 
very foundation for agricultural production in many states” (World Bank, 2004, xx). 
Hence, the effective subsumption of this language of sustainability under the 
dominant technocratic discourse allows its straightforward alignment with the already 
positively connoted and intertwined tropes of productivity and efficiency. Consequently, 
strategies emanating from ex-situ laboratory research and spatially and temporally-
limited field trials such as “modern biotechnology tools, genetic engineering, as well as 
conventional breeding methods are all expected to play important roles in the generation 
of higher yielding, pest and stress resistant varieties of rice, wheat, maize and other cereal 
crops” (IARI, 2006, 10). In this vein, it does not appreciate the potential contradiction 
between “concentrat[ing] on accelerating growth in total factor productivity [and] 
conserving natural resources and promoting ecological integrity of agricultural system” 
(IARI, 2006, 5). With the focus on closing yield gaps, it narrowly frames solutions as 
derived from increased “productivity, often equated to yields, can be enhanced through 
intensification (using more inputs per hectare), through technological advances (better 
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inputs), and/or improved efficiency (using inputs more effectively)” (World Bank, 2014, 
xxi-xxii). 
 Many of the policy approaches and iterations that I have illustrated at the central 
government and international level have permeated to the state level in Karnataka where 
Bangalore is located. Evidence of this commitment to reform into the new millennium 
can be seen in the Karnataka Agriculture Policy 2006 as well as the state’s Integrated 
Agribusiness Development Policy 2011. There is a significant emphasis on “keep[ing] at 
the forefront improving net farm income of the farmer as the prime goal [and hence, the 
perceived need to emphasize] aspects of crop planning, production, technology, 
marketing and prices as foremost components (Government of Karnataka, 2006, 15). This 
productivist paradigm in the latest form is built upon a logic that emphasizes how 
exogenous technical change grounded in Green Revolution epistemological assumptions 
can inexorably lead to sustained livelihood reproduction for all farmers. It is also coupled 
with an air of inevitability in that these latest innovations are seen as evidence of the 
undeniable progress of history and as a result, it is assumed that it is an “imperative that 
Karnataka takes advantage of modern practices, technologies and develop strategies to 
leverage the growing demand in both domestic and international markets” (Government 
of Karnataka, 2011, 5). A significant component of this strategy would come in the form 
of its fast-growing biotechnology sector, evidenced by the number of “companies [in the 
state] increas[ing] from 35 to 92 between 1999-2000 and 2003-04 at an average annual 
growth rate of 28 per cent” (Government of Karnataka, 2006, 68-69) with most of them 
located near Bangalore. However, the presupposition that small farmers can easily benefit 
from the latest policy iterations is difficult to fathom given the further shift away of the 
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agricultural sector and value-creation away from the farm towards increased emphasis on 
the “development of post-harvest infrastructure, agro-corridor, agri-SEZs, agri parks, 
common processing centers, auction houses and rural infrastructure development” 
(Government of Karnataka, 2011, 11). The associated perception of farm harvests as 
mere raw material for industrial inputs for these processing industries marks the complete 
industrialization of agriculture beyond the monoculture production on the field that has 
become ubiquitous over the last half century. 
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Chapter VI: The impasse facing small farmers in periurban Bangalore 
Many of these policy abstractions that optimistically assume that further technical 
change can meaningfully improve small farmer livelihoods do not resonate with many of 
those I interacted with in periurban Bangalore during June-July 2014. As alluded to in the 
introduction, the current situation is one that renders agricultural production increasingly 
uncertain not only in the long-term (~10 years) but also in the short to medium term (~2-
5 years). One of the clearest indicators is how as of 2006, “small and marginal farmers 
account for 72.9 per cent of the total holdings, [but only] cultivat[e] only 34.4 per cent of 
the total cultivable area. The number of holdings increased by 8.58 lakhs [or 858,000] 
due to fragmentation of the land in the last five years. The average size of holding has 
decreased [further] from 1.95 ha to 1.74 ha” (Government of Karnataka, 2006, 9) “with 
the number of holdings having land less than 1.0 ha account[ing] for 42 per cent of the 
total holdings in the state” (Government of Karnataka, 2006, 23), a figure that has most 
likely increased in the years since then.  
Visually, what was most striking was the dryland condition of most of the 
landscape with row crops that seemed to be monocultures for the most part interspersed 
with plots that was either lying fallow or barren land unsuitable for agricultural 
production, with a significant proportion allocated for non-agricultural purposes. I was 
also present during what was supposed to be the onset of the monsoon season. However, 
the rains that many farmers tremendously depend on for the success of their harvest came 
only on a few days of the six weeks I spent doing fieldwork, not to mention the low 
intensity when it did come. This aspect was one of the most prominent themes that 
farmers I spoke to broached. They lamented how monsoon rains had in the recent years 
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become more unreliable in terms of distribution, quantity and timing, with some 
attributing this to the change in the microclimate, especially with reduced tree cover, in 
part due to sand/rock quarrying and urban build up. In addition, a recent study, published 
in the journal Nature has partially attributed these changes in weather patterns as effects 
of global climate change (Singh et al, 2014). Hence, with the deterioration of the most 
fundamental determinant of ecological conditions, production prospects of all types of 
crops are rendered more uncertain. In previous years, the higher level of predictability of 
the rains year after year allowed many to make appropriate production decisions 
regarding when, what and how to sow. Specifically, many farmers pointed to how water-
intensive paddy production has become unviable in the past 2-4 years. 
The widespread, but ultimately unsustainable exploitation of groundwater 
resources through borewell technologies that farmers state were first introduced 20-30 
years ago (which purportedly was initially for the sole purpose of sourcing for drinking 
water) has been employed to offset this increased unpredictability. However, the prime 
motivating factor of its introduction in the past two decades or so is a productivist logic 
that attempts to maximize short-term yields. Taken together, these trends represent how 
agricultural production has more and more become dislodged from ecological realities 
with many farmers lamenting how groundwater levels in many instances are below 1000 
feet from the surface and dropping, exacerbated by how some farmers estimate that only 
5% of borewells are currently functioning. This illustrates the vicious cycle logic that is 
at play in that the predominant response to harsh ecological conditions has not been an 
attempt to alter production practices to respect environmental limits.  
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Before Green Revolution technologies were introduced in this part of India in the 
mid to late 1970s, production logics were very different. A large proportion of the 
farmers I spoke to were from the older generation and recalled that production for 
subsistence was the dominant logic. There was a robust intercropping system that 
included paddy, pulses, groundnut, coconut, betel, ragi (local millet), jowar (local 
maize), cowpea, redgram, greengram, horsegram, sesamum and a limited variety of 
vegetables (greens and tomatoes), many of which had more than one variety used. In 
addition, traditional cow varieties not only provided milk, but also manure as well as 
labor-power for tilling the land. Buffaloes, goats, sheep and chickens also complemented 
the supply of manure as organic fertilizer. Some of this supply was derived from local 
pastoralists who focused on raising livestock on common grazing land. In exchange for 
manure, they were provided with a proportion of the farmer’s crop harvest in transactions 
that did not typically involve any money. “Tank silt” accumulated with the use of 
traditional water collection methods (i.e. harvesting of rainwater) was also widely 
available to restore soil health. It was also a period before high rates of urban 
development when lakes dotted the region’s landscape, with surface and rainwater 
channeled and stored in ponds providing sufficient supplies for agricultural production. 
Interaction with the market was minimal given that only during instances of excess 
production when food was sold whilst purchased needs were mainly limited to oil, 
onions, salt and spices. However, this was not the dominant logic of everyday economic 
life considering that there were also non-monetary practices of mutual assistance in the 
provision of both labor and food. By the 1990s, this interconnected socio-environmental-
economic system would disintegrate to a large extent.  
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However, it is important to not romanticize this type of production as completely 
stable and sufficient in meeting the consumption needs of these communities. For 
example, one older farmer recalled that some extent of drought conditions did affect the 
region for 2-3 years in the late 1960s (during the height of the original Green Revolution 
as discussed earlier). Hence, when external technologies began to be introduced in the 
early 1970s through demonstration plots, there was a certainly a “wow” factor, a change 
of psyches, similar to the logic of the performance of modernity that came with 
interventions of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. The resulting uptake of chemicals 
fertilizers and high yielding seeds was gradual but as its adoption increased, traditional 
practices (reduced number of varieties used in intercropping as well as decreased seed 
saving and the collection and making of organic manure) became less prevalent. This was 
abetted by the supplies were initially given for free through Raitha Samparka Kendras 
(RSKs or local government extension offices), which many farmers mentioned did lead 
to the first spurt in yields into the early 1980s with these inputs continuing to be 
subsidized today, albeit at lower rates in proportion to price increases. A number of 
farmers noted a drop in yields, but a technical fix subsequently came in the form of 
hybrid seeds, which led to another period in increased production. However, many have 
expressed how yields peaked again starting in 1995, with different dates thereafter for 
different crops. Today, RSKs still exist and I had the opportunity to visit one of these 
branches. It was stocked not only with hybrid seeds, fertilizer, pesticide, micro-nutrients, 
micro-irrigation systems and spraying equipment, but also information pamphlets 
regarding how properly to use these products. The farmers present had mentioned that 
nearly everyone in their village depended on this institution for inputs to some extent and 
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are operated by government officials who either had a professional BSc or Master’s 
degree in agricultural science, highlighting how formal scientific approaches are deeply 
entrenched in governmental institutions up till today.  
Another factor that further reinforced reliance on chemical inputs is the 
introduction of hybrid cows, which resulted in the decreased availability and quality of 
organic manure (including cow urine). Its origin arguably can be traced to when the 
World Bank introduced the Operation Flood scheme in the mid-1970s to maximize milk 
production with the intention of increasing farmers’ monetary incomes. All of the 
villages I visited had witnessed the implementation of this policy and as a result, the 
absolute numbers of cows have decreased by up to 70%. While milk production did 
increase, many lamented the drop in quality and nutritional content, not to mention 
burgeoning costs to raise these new varieties of cows and hence increased incomes were 
by no means guaranteed. While these cows require less attention with regards to day-to-
day maintenance, farmers I spoke to mentioned that they get sick more often and thus 
require more medical treatment, thus necessitating more monetary capital. The beginning 
of the enclosure of common grazing land would also lead to an increased reliance on 
grown hybrid fodder if the maximization of milk yields was desired. Hence, this became 
an additional crop that had to be grown or bought, which required monetary capital for 
the procurement of either such supplies or the inputs to grow them. Simultaneously, the 
consequent reduction in animal labor and use of bullock carts in these villages were 
replaced by capital-intensive tractors that began to appear in the 1980s. With these 
increased cash requirements, in part driven by rising expectations as a result of the 
prevailing discourse of improvement and in other expenditures such as education, 
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healthcare and housing, this would induce a continued shift in the mode of production 
towards a higher proportion of monoculture cash crops. As the years pass, this mentality 
would take root and become naturalized, resulting in many, especially amongst the 
younger generation desiring to exit the agricultural sector given its backward and labor-
intensive characterization.  
Thus, the increased penetration of an intertwined technoscientific and capital-
intensive production paradigm has led to qualitative shifts on the level of the 
subjectivities, policy frameworks and institutional structures. Significantly, the effects of 
the initial shifts acted themselves as further causes that serve to reinforce the seemingly 
hegemonic straightjacket of the seeming inevitability of ever more specialization inherent 
in the logic of market-based production, given the need to earn monetary incomes to meet 
basic household needs and pay off debts. Considerations of ecological compatibility 
became less of a concern illustrated by the breaking down of traditional symbiotic 
ecosystem of medicinal plants, trees and birds and weakening associated knowledge 
transmission processes over time. Some farmers also noted that this production logic that 
is premised on the maximization of short-term output would also require higher planting 
densities and shorter crop cycles and hence, increased competition for water and soil 
nutrients which has resulted in more weeds, pest attacks and reduced capacity for soil 
recovery and time for fallow, requiring ever higher quantities of chemical application.  
The most obvious manifestation of these vicious cycles and treadmill effects can 
be seen amongst farmers who have allocated most of their land to grow sugarcane or 
mulberry leaves (to raise silkworms). Sugarcane production was the first cash crop 
introduced in the region on the basis that it would lead to augmented cash incomes and 
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secure livelihoods. However, a number of farmers mentioned that a herd mentality 
became prevalent and coupled with bad weather in the late 1980s, a collapse in the 
market occurred that has never fully recovered since. Price volatility is a constant feature 
of cash crop centric production with a farmer saying that prices per kilogram for raw 
sugarcane have been fluctuating between 150-2000 rupees (in nominal terms) in the last 
20 years. At the time I was doing my fieldwork, there were also massive protests 
organized by the Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha (KRRS), the state’s farmer movement 
against sugarcane mills that had not paid farmers (for years in some instances) for their 
crop. This can be said to be a harbinger for what would worsen already existing 
longstanding structural inequities with the increased focus on value-chain agriculture 
leaving farmers to also have to grapple with exploitative practices by actors at the chain’s 
downstream (McMichael, 2013). Similar logics also structure mulberry leaf production, 
which was the primary cash crop in more than half of the farmer households I interacted 
with and more recently, with horticultural flower production. With regards to the former, 
there was a general sentiment that given overall long-term steady demand, it is the least 
bad crop to grow. However, numerous challenges remain including volatile short-term 
prices (with price varying from 200 to 400 rupees per kilogram in the past year), low 
bargaining power with traders and uncertain tariff policy (i.e. influx of Chinese silk 
depressing prices in the 1990s). 
As a result of increased specialization and the inability of self-production to 
substantially meet consumption needs, there has been a general increase in sourcing food 
from the market as well as an increase in the proportion of income that is spent on such 
needs. Diets would also change towards a greater variety of vegetables and increased 
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consumption of rice whilst the intake of traditional subsistence grains and pulses (which 
are more conducive for production in dryland conditions) have gone down. For those who 
allocate most of their land for cash crops, up to 90% of food needs are procured from the 
local market whilst for most other farmers who are able to grow a combination of 
vegetables, grains and cash crops, this figure is typically at least over 50%. Drastic 
increases in input prices would exacerbate this predicament of increased input needs to 
both sustain necessary levels of production to remain competitive as well as to make up 
for their reduced efficacy over time. Most farmers have noted that chemical fertilizer 
requirements for the same unit area have increased up to five times over the last three 
decades. Many also complain of the low quality of subsidized chemicals with some 
deciding to buy non-subsidized version whilst a number of farmers also directly attribute 
price increases to the withdrawal of state support. One farmer pointed to how high 
yielding seeds were publicly developed by the Karnataka State Seeds Corporation up 
until the 1990s. However, private companies such as Mahyco-Monsanto, Indo-American 
Hybrid Seeds and Rasi have gradually dominated the seed market and given their profit 
motive, seed prices have gone up by up six times (in nominal terms) from 1995 till today.  
As a livelihood diversification strategy, many of the farmers I spoke to also 
attempted, especially in the last decade or so, to take advantage of the increased vegetable 
and fruit demand (new crops such as beans, radish, cabbage, grapes, bananas and 
cucumbers) with the expansion in both the physical size and (middle-class) population of 
Bangalore. However, the purported increased demand was no panacea in terms of 
guaranteeing a pathway out of their current predicament. Many spoke of the fact that 
production of a range of vegetable varieties depends first and foremost on a stable supply 
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of water and given that such supplies are highly variable temporally and spatially, it 
serves as a significant limiting factor. Price volatility would also be a huge factor in terms 
of making production decisions difficult. One farmer commented how prices for carrots 
can fluctuate from 5-40 rupees per kilogram within a year while prices for tomato can 
vary from 10-50 rupees per kilogram within a single month. Hence, while richer farmers 
may be able to adjust their production decisions more nimbly, longer-term ecological 
incompatibility of such a mode of production has become another major concern for 
small farmers who may need to be more attuned to market demand to maximize incomes. 
There is also discontent with regards to how farm gate prices differ greatly than retail 
prices, especially with proposals to expand certain crop markets beyond a legislated 
geographically limited range. This suggests the exploitative character of traders and 
middlemen. One farmer had mentioned that baby corn is procured from him at 7 rupees 
per kilogram while being sold at 70-80 rupees per kilogram to the consumer. Contract 
farming that aims to establish greater stability with agribusinesses providing inputs and 
locking in forward prices have not been able take root amongst many households. These 
arrangements also are criticized for dictating what is produced and when it is required, 
giving little flexibility for farmers to make autonomous production decisions according to 
what they may think is most suitable (in all its meanings) and necessary for meeting their 
household needs. 
Most significantly, a substantial proportion of farmers I spoke to readily 
recognized wide-ranging pitfalls of orienting production practices around market 
demand, with many in hindsight, expressing that they would not have as readily accepted 
this shift despite better conditions and higher yields when technology began to be 
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introduced. For example, a number of farmers pointed to how chemical fertilizers damage 
soil structure and only contribute to plant development and not soil fertility. One farmer 
even pointed out how given that yields are typically measured in terms of mass per unit 
area, large yields do not necessarily point to qualitatively better production outcome 
given the “artificial” boost provided by chemical fertilizers. At a more visceral level, 
many mentioned the negative human health impacts, terming such chemicals as “poison,” 
bringing about kidney and heart problems amongst household members. As a result, there 
is a general consensus of a desire to transition into traditional modes of production, but a 
number of factors prevent them from doing so. A discussion with a group of fifteen 
farmers who are all members of KRRS tellingly illuminates these obstacles. As members 
of the state’s farmers’ movement, they are well aware of how the movement is attempting 
to promote traditional agroecological practices as much as possible and simultaneously in 
the vein of Gandhian self-sufficiency, move farmers away from relying on the market to 
meet livelihood needs. However, almost all of them remain stuck in the dominant mode 
of production. The most significant hindrance is due to an acknowledgment that such a 
transition is a risky proposition to undertake. With heavy chemicalization of the soils, it 
would take at least three years for land rehabilitation and conversion back into 
agroecological-based production to take place.  Many are unable to risk the potential 
sudden drop in yields if they were to suddenly change their practices given the need to 
fulfill immediate short-term needs. In addition, themes such as loss in knowledge, 
especially with regards to the complexities as well as the lack of interest amongst young 
people who have grown up during a time period when modernization ideals have become 
ubiquitous were also brought up. One farmer noted how even as the availability of 
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biomass inputs for fertilizer has decreased, laborers are now paid to collect them as 
opposed to “fights” that would take place in earlier decades over such supplies. Another 
common theme was the perennial inability of the government to incentivize production 
practices that may be more ecologically appropriate. Many had raised the point that if the 
government decided to reallocate resources away from subsidizing chemical inputs or to 
guarantee output prices beyond abysmally low Minimum Support Price (MSP), farmers 
would respond accordingly to reorient production practices.  
Therefore, with substantial amounts of capital required for various purposes and 
the low profitability of the current production environment, it comes as no surprise that 
there is a reliance for many households on non-agricultural incomes or work as 
agricultural laborers to meet basic needs, let alone catalyze meaningful improvements to 
their livelihoods as promised by the developmentalist logic. However, the dominant top-
down societal representation of India’s increased non-agricultural sector is an 
overwhelmingly positive one, invisibilizing experiential perspectives derived from 
everyday struggles. In this sense, the increasing unviability in sustaining agricultural 
production is due not only to a worsening ecological context and technology fatigue, but 
also at a fundamental level, how many express lack of returns due to volatile and 
stagnating prices, hence persuading many not to take the risk of sowing in the first place. 
One farmer mentioned how it may be more cost-effective to buy basic ragi staple needs 
from the market, rather than growing it himself. Parcels of eucalyptus tree plantations 
that require little maintenance also dot the landscape and which can be harvested for the 
manufacturing of wood and paper products, suggesting that better prospects lie in non-
food crop production that do not require the risk of expending much upfront capital for 
63 
 
inputs. For others who need to pay off accumulated debts, they have sold off (parts of) 
their landholdings, engendering long-term uncertainty with regards to how their 
livelihoods can be reproduced in a stable manner. The trend of reverse leasing was also 
raised by many wherein small farmers who decide not to work their fields lease out their 
land to larger farmers who may be able to better contend with the harsh economic 
environment, thus unwittingly further aggravating the inequalities between farmers of 
different classes. One significant coping strategy for small farmer households would 
come with employment in industries in textile, automobile and low end manufacturing 
factories that began operations from the early 1990s. Today, a vast majority of 
households have at least one member working in these facilities with some deriving up to 
over 70% of their incomes from these jobs.  
In addition, especially amongst the older generation, I sensed a hesitant attitude 
towards the seeming naturalness of an income-based livelihood strategy. Many of them 
lamented the loss in self-sufficiency and pride in being able to grow their own food needs 
or having to part ways with their land. However, despite this lament, many also feel that 
they are not able to meaningfully fight against inequitable structures and policies and that 
agricultural production in the villages around Bangalore would more or less disappear 
within the next 10 years. This is most salient when the theme of education came about. 
While many expressed how they desire for their children to remain in agriculture, the 
onerous structural environment lead to an emphasis on investing in educational 
opportunities for the younger generation, many of whom cannot be persuaded to remain 
interested in working the fields anyway, despite increased mechanization. Ironically, this 
mentality illustrates how the internalization of the improvement ideal has become 
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(in)advertently pervasive, thus it further contributing to the devaluation and decline of 
agricultural production.  
Therefore, it is not too surprising that forms of sociality and communal relations 
at the village level have drastically altered illustrating, “the erosion of entrenched 
cosmogonies and the growth of new symbolic forms in rural India [with the growing] 
absorption of India’s plural and diverse rural cultures into the larger political economic 
regime (Vasavi, 1999, 1) simultaneously as the “separation of the economic dimensions 
of agriculture from its previous embeddedness in the local cultural and social complex of 
the society” (Vasavi, 1999, 129) occurs. The themes of responsibilization with intense 
levels of competition as alluded to earlier have become characteristic of everyday social 
life. With each household struggling to reproduce their livelihoods, my observations align 
with previous fieldwork in the 1990s done in Northern Karnataka on how “the axiom of 
dharmakarya became distanced in the face of increasing commercialization of agriculture 
[as] traditional time-tested methods of storing grains, reliance on kin and affinal networks 
and temporary migration were also changed” (Vasavi, 1999, 18). Many interactions have 
increasingly become transactional, wherein norms of reciprocal non-commodified 
exchange imbued with cultural meaning have weakened. One example of this is how 
rules governing borewell use are not being followed in many of the villages I did my 
fieldwork in. Ideally, there should be a separation of 250 meters between borewells. 
However, with decreased communal arrangements with each household responsible for 
sourcing for inputs in discrete, individual plots for the most part, one farmer mentioned 
how there are instances wherein the separation distance is a mere 5 meters. Officially, 
only around 1000 borewells are authorized to be dug in his specific taluk. However in 
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reality, it is estimated that 10,000 borewells actually exist. Alcoholism has been a 
widespread problem even as around 3-4 groups of farmers I spoke to pointed to cases of 
suicides occurring within or around their village in recent years. This illustration of the 
weakening of the moral economy would result in the rise in importance of social status, 
illustrated by how, especially amongst larger farmers are beginning to flaunt their wealth.  
In effect, my fieldwork highlights how the challenges of agricultural production in 
periurban Bangalore is arguably a microcosm of the predicament many small farmers all 
across India face. It also shows that the purported benefits of the latest technocratic 
policy iterations in terms of value-chain agriculture have not and are unlikely to ever be 
realized, rendering uncertain the continued reproduction of livelihoods. Despite this 
precarity, the truth regime of market-based production intertwined with high levels of 
technological use has become strongly embedded as part of everyday socio-economic 
life, whilst many contend with the inability to break out of vicious cycles of debt and 
technological treadmills. The changes in subjectification is important to highlight here in 
the sense that fundamental logics underlying currently existing production practices have 
been accepted to a large extent as inescapable boundary conditions. As a result, the 
notion of farmer agency and hence blame for currently existing problems require nuanced 
analysis. Nonetheless, completely absolving culpability of the technologies themselves 
and the externally-derived assumptions that justify their use is also wrongheaded. 
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Chapter VII: The further threat coming from land acquisition in the context of the 
discourse of the global city  
  
 Notwithstanding, an additional complicating influence that requires interrogation 
is the proximity of the areas where I did my fieldwork to one of the fastest growing cities 
in the world with the burgeoning physical expansion of Bangalore’s spatial extent 
stemming from investments in so-called high value sectors of real estate, biotechnology 
and information technology. Hence, the ambivalent sentiments of many small farmer 
households towards the presence of the non-farm “low-end” manufacturing sector would 
drastically change in a negative way as the emergence of these non-farm urban, service, 
knowledge and “high-end” manufacturing sectors would encroach onto their agricultural 
lands, in part to establish special economic zones for these latter sectors to thrive. The 
overarching underpinnings that define this contemporary economic strategy can be also 
attributed to the same liberalization policies that affected agriculture in 1991 with the 
assumption of the need to realize higher rates of economic growth requiring a scale-back 
of direct state involvement in the economy. Thus, by allowing the private sector to reign 
more freely, such actors would be incentivized to invest capital in these latter sectors that 
are perceived to contribute to the creation of a higher proportion of monetary value and 
economic growth. It further self-reinforces governmental neglect for the agricultural 
sector, with this logic similar to the Nehruvian emphasis on industrial growth during the 
first years of India’s independence.  
In my field experience, this is exemplified by a number of farmers lamenting both 
the physical diversion of water sources (both lakes and groundwater) towards urban 
consumption and industrial manufacturing processes as well as the pollution that flows 
back to their farms that are for the most part go untreated which itself leads to 
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deteriorating production conditions. However, the contestation over water resources are 
merely the tip of the iceberg given that the spatial expansion of the city necessitates the 
acquisition of farmland. The two main legislative provisions that allow state governments 
to be able to do so are the Special Economic Zone Act of 2005 and the “Right to Fair 
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement 
Bill (RFCTLARR). RFCTLARR replace[d] the colonial Land Acquisition Act of 1894 
(LAA). [In effect], the state [can] acquire land for private parties, if the latter’s use of the 
land fulfills a public purpose” (Sud, 2014, 43). It is with this discursive assumption that 
all forms of economic activity will necessarily bring about benefits to a so-called 
abstracted notion of the public represented as a homogenous entity that obscures how “a 
large number of farmers, agricultural laborers, fisherfolk and allied workers are getting 
displaced from land and livelihoods, leading to fierce resistance movements in different 
parts of the country and resultant state atrocities and violence” (Banerjee-Guha, 2008, 
51). A whole range of policy provisions in the SEZ Act of 2005 such as “exemption from 
customs duties, central excise duties, service taxes, central sales taxes, and securities 
transaction taxes; and a tax holiday for fifteen years, including a 100% income tax 
exemption for ten of the fifteen years for SEZ developers” (Walker, 2008, 588) attempt to 
incentivize the creation of these zones in their latest form and absolve corporations from 
societal responsibility even as private gains accumulate.  
Yet, I contend the main driving force behind this shift can be attributed more 
fundamentally to a specific philosophy becoming ever more authoritative at a discursive 
level. With the current economic doctrine of the infallibility of unfettered free markets 
creating value to grow India’s economy, “any activity that can generate a higher-value 
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land use than agriculture — no matter how unproductive or speculative — now 
constitutes a ‘public purpose’ that warrants the forcible expropriation of land from 
farmers. We can characterize this as a shift from a regime that dispossesses ‘land for 
production’ to one that dispossesses ‘land for the market’” (Levien, 2013, 396) with “the 
SEZ Act requir[ing] that only 35% (later raised to 50%) of the land acquired for SEZs be 
used for ‘processing’” (Levien, 2013, 395). Given that much of the associated economic 
activity taking place in high-value sectors such as information technology, the vast 
majority of the country's population of small farmers will likely see little benefit. 
Furthermore, the rest of what is acquired can be used for speculative purposes and hence, 
“although the SEZs were originally promoted as a means of generating an industrial 
boom, in many instances they have already degenerated into a real estate racket” 
(Walker, 2008, 588). As a result, not only is the value of land’s complex socio-cultural-
ecological contexts, knowledges and histories reduced to an abstract monetary quantity 
and hence able to be traded in a market, this ontological simplification subsequently gains 
an apolitical, objective and technical veneer (i.e. land is capital) hence giving the 
justification for corporate control in the name of generalizable trope of economic growth 
without regard for its distributional implications. The Marxist distinction between use 
value and exchange value is especially salient here wherein surplus accumulation of a 
small number of private actors with “the privatization of public or commonable land into 
exclusively owned plots [taking precedence over] long-standing use rights to that land” 
(Ghertner, 2014, 1563). It has been estimated that from independence through to 2007, 
“70 million rural households hav[e] been dispossessed [while around this time of two 
years after the passage of the SEZ Act of 2005] 366 SEZ proposals and approximately 
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another 180 on an ‘in-principle’ basis” (Walker, 2008, 587) had been approved with 29 of 
these being in Karnataka.  
More broadly, what is happening in India is characteristic of a broader 
contemporary global phenomenon known as “land grabbing,” which could be described 
as “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003), wherein the already minuscule 
means of production of a large number of small farmers who are already struggling to 
subsist are forcibly taken away from them to establish plantations, industrial zones and 
speculative entities on the basis of catalyzing the never-ending push to integrate more and 
more local communities into the global economy. This push to commodify rural life is 
not merely the latest effort in subsuming the mode of production under a market logic, 
but crucially, it also physically alienates small farmers from their basic means of 
production. As a result, what occurs is actually an intentional effort to increase the 
reliance of households on the market to meet basic needs (food, water and otherwise) is 
represented as a natural and inevitable progression of how economic structures must 
evolve and modernize. This normative proposition is hence further internalized by small 
farmers as the latest iteration of the market truth regime that must not be questioned. With 
compensation coming in the form of “smaller pieces of developed (commercial and 
residential) land, farmers [are given] a stake in the real estate appreciation or enhanced 
market demand. This neoliberal compensation model was in some ways an application to 
land acquisition of the De Sotoean proposition that the best solution to poverty is to give 
the poor secure property rights that they can leverage in markets to harness their 
microentrepreneurial abilities” (Levien, 2012, 953). 
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Furthermore, it is important to note that it is a misnomer to simply conclude that 
liberalization brought about the withdrawal of the state from economic activity given that 
land acquisition is “fundamentally a political process in which states – or other coercion 
wielding entities – use extra-economic force to help capitalists overcome barriers to 
accumulation” (Levien, 2012, 940). By bringing another dimension to understanding the 
role of the state in enforcing neoliberal economic doctrine, it shows how this framework 
further disciplines individuals to conform to what are depicted as value-free economic 
policies. With the formalization of SEZs legitimized under the rule of law, “the 
criminalization of subaltern informalities” stigmatizes unproductive small farmers as not 
only individuals who hinder growth, but also labels them as criminals wherein actions at 
resisting integration into the broader Indian economic project are deemed illegal. Hence, 
rather than understanding the emergence of Indian industrialization/urbanization in its 
current form as the result of historical inevitability of an invisible hand guiding the 
abstracted notion of the free market, “the bourgeois city and its edifices of prosperity are 
produced through the practices [or technologies] of the state” (Roy, 2011, 233). 
It has been observed that “the expansion of India’s secondary circuit of capital has 
taken place primarily through the urbanization of periurban, rural, and protected land 
[such as] in the satellite cities of Gurgaon and NOIDA in the National Capital Region, in 
the corridor between Mumbai and Pune, in Kolkata’s New Town, and in the edge 
settlements beyond Bangalore’s Electronic City” (Ghertner, 2014, 1559). I was based at 
this so-called Electronic City from which I made my trips to villages within an hour’s 
proximity by vehicle. As a SEZ, this “city” itself is typical of the transformation of the 
Bangalore metropolitan area and was either formerly farmland or freshwater lakes. It is 
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currently expanding into surrounding areas, through processes aptly named Phases II-IV. 
Its everyday lifeworld is qualitatively different than in the villages I did my fieldwork in. 
Firstly, most of economic activity is mainly derived from the high-value information 
sector, with the dominance of multinational companies such as Hewlett-Packard, 3M and 
many of their local counterparts, including national powerhouses such as Wipro and 
Infosys. In my time walking around this “city,” I inferred that many of the employees of 
these companies were highly educated with professional qualifications given their formal 
office attire. The dormitory-style accommodation I was staying at was also one of a 
number of facilities that catered to short-to-medium term employees who are not 
originally from Bangalore, with some from outside of India, suggesting an influx of talent 
from elsewhere attracted to these opportunities. There are also a number of high-rise 
modern apartments catering to those who have permanently settled down, with Concorde 
Silicon Valley, Concorde Manhattans and Concorde Cuppertino (sic) being examples of 
names of these housing facilities, suggesting a desire to mimic Western lifestyles.  
Notwithstanding, both logics are intricately intertwined in characterizing how 
contemporary Bangalorean and Indian society operates on the basis of replicative 
template developmentalism  coupled with the increasing emphasis placed on the success 
of high value industry and service sectors. Simultaneously as this external referencing 
takes place, its discursive perpetuation requires the projection of middle class norm, 
epitomized by skilled employees working in Electronic City with the assumption that 
everyone, no matter what socio-economic background should aspire to and are able to 
realize this ideal. Again, this contributes to the continued penetration of the notion of the 
entrepreneurial self-produced economic subject into all sectors in that social mobility is 
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guaranteed for all on the basis of the diligent and industrious individual taking 
advantages of purported opportunity offered equally to all by modern society. Not only 
are these notions devoid of any assessment of socio-cultural-ecological context in that 
well-being determined by monetary accumulation may not be desirable or possible, it 
also ignores power relations between different societal stakeholders as illustrated in 
existing trends of land dispossession and commitment to technoscientific policies. 
The twinning of truth regime abstractions of this middle-class ideal as well as the 
entrepreneurial individual (in both the urban and the rural context) are central in the 
portrayal in global societal discourse of present-day India as a rising economic 
superpower defined primarily on the basis of the GDP growth rate indicator. This 
representation is itself a generalized abstraction that glosses over contextual 
heterogeneities at lower spatial scales, coupled with selective quantitative socio-
economic trends it employs to maintain this image. At its center is the depiction of logic 
of developmentalism advancing towards its latter stages, given that “the share of services 
ha[ving] risen from around two-fifths to over one-half of GDP, [with] the largest rise 
being in trade, hotels, transport and communications followed by finance, real estate and 
business services” (Patnaik, 2007, 6) between 1990 and 2004. Importantly, it emphasizes 
the progress already made in moving the focus of the country’s economy (and hence its 
global representation) away from backward subsistence agriculture towards actualizing 
the promises of development epitomized in the making of the global city.  
At even a higher abstract level, this notion of Rising India is part of a wider 
discourse of Rising Asia, wherein “global rebalancing in the last two decades as many 
countries of the global South—particularly some of the big Asian economies of China, 
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India and Indonesia have witnessed high economic growth rates. The economic 
significance of Rising Asia has also led to greater political influence for some of these 
nations” (Raghuram et al, 2013, 119). Hence, the labeling of India as an emerging 
country for the inflow of capital not only evokes a sentiment of bountiful opportunities 
catalyzing growth for all, with the less explicit assumption that “the masses still expected 
to benefit by the trickling down of employment and incomes from these successes” 
(Harriss and Corbridge, 2010, 40). Another significant aspect that informs the realization 
of Rising India is how the fashioning of Indian cities is modeled upon the norms of 
already established counterparts.  Analogous to the superior quality of knowledge claims 
and production practices inherent in the logic of agricultural modernization present since 
the height of decolonization, there was “a kind of psychological vertigo induced in Asian 
leaders by the distance to be traveled in order to catch up with the development 
benchmarks and metropolitan ideals established by and in the West” (Ong, 2011, 8). In 
its latest iteration, the commitment to compare a city’s success on the basis of an external 
reference point would come in the form of what Aihwa Ong terms as “inter-Asia inter-
referencing.” She goes on to detail how 
“through the favorable mention, allusion, and even endorsement of another city, actors 
and institutions position their own projects in a language of explicit comparison and 
ranking, thus vicariously participating in the symbolic values of particular cities. The 
idiom of inter-referencing pits cities in relation to one another, by invoking desirable 
icons of “world class” amenities – upscale hotels, shopping malls, entertainment and 
conventions facilities, symphonies, opera houses, international enclaves, and airports – as 
symbols of desirable urban attributes….The constant allusion to other cities energizes 
efforts to assemble ideas, forms, and alliances in order to “catch up” with pace-setting 
cities that now exist outside the West. As inter-referencing practices drive speculations 
on a city’s future residents and citizens are often caught up as well in a kind of 
disciplinary inter-city rivalry” (Ong, 2011, 18). 
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 Uncannily, this logic emphasizing comparability resembles much of the impetus 
that justified the adoption of agricultural technologies that originated elsewhere. Firstly, it 
posits the existence of an ideal-type urban counterpart that possess what are presupposed 
to be superior qualities assessed upon universalizable, fungible criteria that devalues pre-
existing socio-spatial lifeworlds, practices and material structures based upon local 
cultural context. Secondly, attempted homogenization of place-making with “inter-
referentiality shap[ing] an intense inter-city consciousness of contrast, comparison, and 
rivalry” (Ong, 2011, 23) highlight how these flows of ideas and standards influence the 
subjectivities of individuals (ranging from the periurban small farmer to the 
parliamentarians in the state legislative assembly) to accept what are perceived to be 
neutral norms that must be adhered to during this age of the reality of unstoppable 
economic globalization. The subsequent manifestation in policy frameworks and material 
infrastructures only serve to reinforce and naturalize their seeming inevitability, aligning 
well with how the logics of how agricultural technologies and their epistemological 
assumptions over the last half century have come to pervade current modes of production.  
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Chapter VIII: The positioning of Bangalore as a global city and its relation to 
current trajectory of Indian developmentalism   
 
 The recent rapid growth of Bangalore is both symbolic of and itself a prime 
contributor towards the push in emphasizing the role of urbanization and “high-value” 
manufacturing and service sectors as essential towards the fulfillment of India’s 
development trajectory in order to achieve global economic superpower status. Its plans 
are grandiose to say the least given its expansion “from 226 square km to 696 square km 
recently, with ambitions to expand to 7,000 square km over the next few decades, [with 
its] hop[es] to becom[ing] one of the world’s largest megalopolises. [As alluded to 
earlier, the state of Karnataka’s] newly empowered and internationally debt-financed 
parastatals oversee the rapid expansion of the city boundaries, the congealing of rural 
governments into a world-city one, [with] projects of land acquisition, airport and 
highway construction, housing townships, and new water and sanitation infrastructure” 
(Goldman, 2011, 557). Relatedly, “the total population of Bangalore urban agglomeration 
area increased from 2.92 million in 1981 to 4.13 million in 1991 and to 5.69 million in 
2001” (Narayana, 2010, 1286), with this figure having increased to over 10.1 million as 
of 2014. With its significant IT industry (emblematic of the country’s current focus on 
late-stage developmentalism), the city is known as the Silicon Valley of India, with many 
international and national companies “plopping themselves down in cow pastures, 
spinach fields and drained irrigation tanks (small lakes) on the southern and eastern 
outskirts of the city” (Goldman, 2011, 559). Again, these qualitative changes should not 
be seen as an inevitable result of teleological progress but are actually brought about 
through intentional policies given that  
76 
 
“Karnataka was the first state in India to announce a separate policy for the promotion 
and development of information technology in the state (i.e. Information Technology 
Policy 1997) whose objectives were to increase domestic and export earnings. 
Subsequently, the state announced the Millennium IT Policy in 2000. These policies 
encourage the use of information technology in educational institutions, government, 
industry and infrastructure sectors, and provide incentives and concessions and special 
assistance for the attraction of investment and promotion of exports” (Narayana, 2011, 
1293-1294). 
 
As a result, “Bangalore’s Gross District Income from the ICT sector increased from about 
Rs 33 billion in 2000/01 to Rs 47 billion in 2002/03 and to Rs 103 billion in 2004/05 
(23.66% of GDI or 9.55% of Karnataka’s GDP)” (Narayana, 2011, 1296), with “the ICT 
sector contribut[ing] 10.9% in 1993/94, 70.8% in 1999/2000, and 70.6% in 2004/05” 
(Narayana, 2011, 1292). Processes of land acquisition are in full swing given its “world-
city master plan calls for the incorporation of hundreds of villages and towns on its 
periphery in order to meet its ambitious growth targets for the next 10 or so years” 
(Goldman, 2011, 572).  
As mentioned, a significant direct role is played by parastatal agencies, with its 
characterization as a psuedo-public entity deliberately allowing private interests to be 
able to frame their economic activity as automatically serving the public. These agencies 
include   
“the Bangalore Development Agency (BDA) overseeing the Comprehensive 
Development Plan; Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development and Finance 
Corporation (KUIDFC) set up by the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to 
oversee their funds; and Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (KIADB) which 
negotiates land acquisitions for mega-city schemes. The world-city project-based 
parastatals include Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority (BIAAPA) 
and Bangalore–Mysore Infrastructural Corridor Area Planning Authority (BMICAPA). 
Parastatals are unique in that they depend largely upon external and project financing, 
and have little or no local oversight, being directly accountable only to the lenders and to 
the Karnataka chief minister, a party-elected official” (Goldman, 2011, 562). 
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The support coming from international financial institutions can be seen as part of the 
efforts starting in the 1990s of how the World Bank shifted the implementation of its 
agenda from the national to the local level, with Karnataka being one of the focus states.  
It would be not be a far stretch to characterize “KIADB [as having] become brokers of 
large-scale public and private land transfers” (Goldman, 2011, 567) despite being 
justified on the basis of what is seen to be the axiomatic rule of law (i.e. state versions of 
national SEZ and land acquisition policies). Currently, the Karnataka State Assembly is 
in the process of deliberating its version of the RFCTLARR, with the 1961 Karnataka 
Land Reforms Act remaining the central piece of legislation that governs the rules 
surrounding land transfer. Interestingly, the original version has provisions in sections 63, 
79A, 79B and 80, which has language such as instituting a landholding ceiling of 5 
hectares, disallowing households with annual incomes more than 2 lakhs (1 lakh=100,000 
rupees) from owning land, only allowing cultivators to own land and preventing the 
transfer of land to non-agriculturalists (Government of Karnataka, 1962). While there are 
exemptions from these provisions (which also presume “land” refers to agricultural land 
unless otherwise stated) such as the acquisition of land for productive industrial purposes 
(in the Nehruvian spirit) and rules that allow land to be forfeited into the government land 
bank, this could be seen as evidence of a degree of on paper commitments to social 
welfare back in the years after independence that prevent the excesses of inequitable land 
distribution. In recent years, the spirit of the law has been neglected as these exemptions 
are being exploited to maximize land acquisition for private gain. Furthermore, the recent 
passage of the Karnataka Land Reforms and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Bill in 
July 2014 now explicitly authorizes a more straightforward process towards granting 
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governmental clearance for land used for non-agricultural purposes, justified with the 
classic neoliberal trope of cutting red tape and reducing governmental bureaucracy 
(Times of India, 2014).   
 My own experiences as well as my interactions with small farmers highlight how 
the city’s recent growth has sidelined the needs of the majority of the periurban 
population. My impression of the city upon arriving at Bangalore airport (itself built on 
land acquired from small farmers) would foreshadow the stark contrast I would witness 
between the villages I visited and the never-ending construction of commercial buildings 
and luxurious residential apartments that were not confined to a small core in the city 
proper. One of the first aspects that stood out were the numerous billboards that 
advertised these residential apartments by depicting the desirability of a modern urban, 
market-oriented lifestyle and using fantastical slogans such as “luxury with a conscience, 
urban highs with a simple price, the millionaire life--the millionaire’s home and dare to 
dream--strive to achieve.” These tropes simultaneously reinforce the notion of individual 
success based upon entrepreneurial values (and that the rich justifiably deserve their 
riches) whilst playing up late-stage developmentalism, which it itself not so innocuously 
also contributes to. One particular billboard went to the extent of being unapologetic 
about the increasing wealth of a tiny elite in posing the question “many of Bangalore’s 
discerning 1% have booked their luxury villas. Isn’t it time you did too?” This seemingly 
neutral statement exemplifies the highly out-of-touch nature of these developments that 
only benefit a small minority, whilst at the same time spreading the myth of equal 
opportunity and meritocracy. This sentiment of a lack of direct connection with the 
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overall expansion of Bangalore, not to mention the upscale real estate developments was 
an enduring theme throughout my conversations with the small farmers I spoke to.   
The clearest indication of the ubiquity of land acquisition is how in my travels 
outwards from my base at Electronic City to conduct my qualitative interviews, 
agricultural production on plots of land taking place under already adverse dryland 
conditions was interspersed with housing plots that either were already under 
construction or fenced up, with clear signs indicating their intended non-agricultural use. 
As mentioned earlier, urban requirements win out in the competition for water resources, 
evidenced by water pipelines pumping water directly from the Kaveri River that lies 
beyond the rural fringes towards Bangalore bypassing the needs of the periurban 
population. Another telltale sign of Bangalore’s rapid development is the numerous 
trucks filled with sand and rock driving towards the city in the early evenings from the 
rural surroundings whilst simultaneously urban day laborers, in buses filled to the brim 
were being driven out of the city back to their villages, indicating both the significant 
amount of material resources and cheap labor necessary for the city’s build up. The 
ecological consequences (including directly on soil/land health for agricultural 
production) in the areas surrounding the city are visibly evident with prevalent sand 
mining operations requiring the denudation of vegetation and of hills that were once 
home to a much more complex agroecological system.  
There are two specific areas where I had the opportunity to engage with 
households where land acquisition is currently highly contested. Firstly, there is the area 
north of the city proper adjacent to new international airport with official plans in motion 
to further “transform the land surrounding it into high-value gated residential 
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communities, seven-star hotel complexes, ‘medical tourism’ hospitals, and business 
centers” (Goldman, 2011, 569). Secondly, I also spoke to small farmers in the northern 
section of the “Bangalore–Mysore Industrial Corridor (BMIC) heading south to Mysore 
from the southern edge of Bangalore” (Goldman, 2011, 568) with estimates back in 2008 
that “more than 200,000 rural people w[ould] be displaced” (Goldman, 2011, 566) from 
this specific massive project. Those I spoke to had significant proportions of land in their 
villages already acquired or notified for future acquisition. A topic that dominated 
discussions was while land prices have skyrocketed in recent years, there is still 
significant variation based on specific location. One farmer who began farming in the 
1950s noted how land prices (in nominal terms) back then were around 1000 rupees per 
acre as compared to 20 lakhs per acre today. In most cases, farmers mentioned how 
market land prices never rose above 10 lakhs per acre around the turn of the century, but 
are mostly in the range of 40-60 lakhs per acre today. However, if the plot of desired land 
was closer to roads or the city center (adjacent to where SEZs have already been 
established), farmers have quoted market prices of 3-4 crore or in rare instances up to 8 
crore per acre for most prime land. Many were animated with regards to how official 
government compensation not only have constantly been delayed, in some cases for years 
after the land was initially acquired, but also how the actual sums received were 
substantially lower than market prices with many payouts below 10 lakhs. This 
corroborates with earlier research highlighting how KIADB “offers a relative pittance to 
the non-elite members of rural communities, exercising its right to choose the depressed 
rural market price and not the upscale world-city market price as its marker” (Goldman, 
2011, 566), thereby themselves directly profiting off land sales. This demonstrates how 
81 
 
exploitative relationships between small farmers and elite societal stakeholders, now 
including the state government itself, know no end. For those who have had their land 
acquired, many have resorted to odd jobs such as airport maintenance workers and low-
skill industrial and manufacturing (food processing, quarrying) and low-end urban 
services (cleaners, cooks).  
 For the most part, many of the farmers I spoke to were adamant that in an ideal 
situation and despite the high prices for land, they would be unwilling to sell or allow the 
government to acquire their land given their longstanding economic and cultural 
relationship to it, some of which have lasted for many generations since pre-colonial 
times. This highlights how some recognize that value of their land cannot be reduced to a 
quantifiable monetized figure. However, some also simultaneously lamented how their 
communities have been subsumed under the logic of the cash and consumer economy and 
given the combination of adverse production conditions, lack of youth interest of staying 
in agriculture as well as difficulties in effectively organizing resistance against land 
acquisition claims, there might be no choice but to give up their lands in the medium to 
long-term (~3-5 years from now). 
At the same time, some degree of optimistic ambivalence would add a 
contradictory element in what seems to be a complex amalgam of individual and 
collective sentiment towards the processes of socio-economic transformation that are 
taking place. Some of the middle-aged farmers I spoke to feel that some degree of change 
with the decline of agriculture is inevitable and find hope that their children will be able 
to thrive in other economic sectors that may be more remunerative. As a result, these 
farmers dedicate considerable proportion of incomes towards investment in education 
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with the hope that such qualifications will allow them to escape the current logic of 
agricultural production. This shows the extent of the potency of idea of improvement 
central to the discourse of developmentalism remains lodged in the psyches of many 
individuals given its resilience in face of substantial socio-economic dislocation and how 
benefits have accrued disproportionately to a privileged few. The faith placed by many in 
the ability of individual perseverance and effort to amount to improved livelihood 
prospects assumes that dominant economic structures will necessarily allow for 
meaningful social mobility out of agriculture to occur for small farmer households. A 
recent study, albeit of the urban poor in Bangalore, corroborates well with this sentiment. 
“Thirty per cent of all respondents aspired that their child should become a medical 
doctor; another 17 per cent mentioned engineer or software engineer as the aspiration for 
their child; while 15 per cent mentioned senior government official. ‘Own business’ was 
mentioned by another 10 per cent….The vast majority of parents aspire for their children 
to rise higher than themselves. The spending priorities of slum households reflect these 
aspirations. Children’s – both girls’ and boys’ – education is the number one spending 
priority for as many as 513 households (35%)” (Krishna, 2011, 1015).  
 
However, the same survey highlights that 
“no one in these 14 slums is a doctor, lawyer, or software professional. Making matters 
worse, hardly any slum resident is preparing to take up such occupations; very few even 
complete an undergraduate degree. If considerable numbers of people were, in fact, 
becoming doctors or engineers or lawyers, thereafter moving out of slums, then one 
should expect to find among current slum residents more than a few students preparing 
for such careers. The fact that not one young man or woman in the surveyed households 
is a medical college or business school or law school student, and no more than two are 
studying engineering, provides further indication of a limited set of prospects” (Krishna, 
2011, 1018). 
 
Hence, despite the massive disconnect between aspirations of a majority of these 
communities mired in poverty towards realizing a better economic position and the 
actually existing reality of the limited access of high-end career positions reflecting 
limited social mobility and even as conditions structuring agricultural production become 
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ever more precarious, many retain (misguided) hope in how their situation will 
meaningfully improve eventually. In this sense, if it is the case that poor households have 
either (un)willingly acquiesced to or wholeheartedly embraced the purported axiom that 
neoliberal economic doctrine can provide win-win opportunities for them to better their 
livelihood prospects, it would seem as if any consequential change to the current 
dominant socio-economic paradigm is unlikely to happen anytime soon. To make matters 
worse, there is a vested interest by the growing urban middle class to ensure that status 
quo is sustained given that it is “availability of low-paid personal services helps make a 
large Indian city’s economy competitive in terms of attracting highly skilled 
professionals. If Bangalore’s richer inhabitants were to suddenly stop receiving the 
services of slum dwellers, if they had to tend their own lawns, cook their own food, do 
their own groceries, clean their own homes, type their own notes, arrange their own 
appointments, and drive their own cars, would so many globally mobile professionals 
continue to live and work in Bangalore?” (Krishna, 2011, 1025). Again, the theme of the 
(in)advertent subsidization of the formal non-agricultural sectors by both the urban and 
rural poor emerges once again, highlighting the existence of a seemingly inevitable 
mechanism that self-fulfills the logic of developmentalism.  
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Chapter IX: Non-totalizability of technoscientific and neoliberal economic doctrines  
 
Over the past several chapters, I have demonstrated how processes of agricultural 
modernization and the broader logic of developmentalism in India that began in earnest 
during the 1950s post-independence period have been able to remain hegemonic despite 
significant dislocations and adverse impacts on small farmers who today still make up a 
more than half of the country’s population. I contend that they remain legitimate largely 
because of how their constructed ideational underpinnings (in the notions of progress, 
development, technology, science, capital, modernity, entrepreneurship, growth) have 
been able to gain connotations of neutrality, universality and positivity that successfully 
(and arguably, in a deliberate manner) obscure both complex socio-cultural context and 
inequitable power relations between different societal groups.  
However, to unproblematically conclude that systemic changes are not possible in 
realizing alternatives to the current predicament would itself accord too much legitimacy 
and authority in determining how socio-economic structures may evolve within a pre-
given epistemological paradigm. In addition, it also negates the existence of everyday 
modes of resistance, subjective experiences and lingering alternative livelihood practices 
that do not align completely with technoscientific and neoliberal frameworks that 
interpellate individuals to think, behave and operate in specific ways. In this sense, 
multiple analytical lens can be employed to interrogate and comprehend social 
phenomenon. By acknowledging that there is not a single objective way to make sense of 
our world around us, we can recognize that discourse itself creates realities, in that 
language does not merely have descriptive quality, but also an enactive one, which itself 
illustrates the falsity of the seemingly neutral connotations that the predominantly 
technocratic logic of developmentalism is associated with. As I have alluded to earlier, 
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this characteristic is similar to how the emergence of statistical regime at a specific 
moment in time changed how we come perceive the realm of “the economy” and how its 
success is assessed. For the most part till now, I have utilized an analytical lens that 
attempt to show how generalized and abstract market and technological logics, 
implemented beginning in a top-down manner and compounded by the Foucauldian 
notion of diffuse micropower have made these “truth regimes” to dominate the modes of 
agricultural production and broader economic activity. By introducing ground-level 
perspectives and interpretations that grasp the dominant economic framework as not a 
historical inevitability but as an assemblage--a contingent coming together of ideas, 
materials, infrastructures and technologies in a specific spatio-temporal context, the 
explicit refusal of the complete subsumption of complex historical socio-economic-
cultural contexts, meanings and practices under hegemonic logics can occur. In doing so, 
the notion of non-totalizability emerges as a concept that prevents both the discursive and 
real foreclosure of the potential of meaningful, systemic change. While on one hand we 
can interpret Foucauldian micropower as being an ubiquitous force in determining how 
one thinks and behaves and hence how institutional structures are becoming ever 
technocratic in character. On another hand, we could assert that these processes that 
attempt at sedimenting status quo will never be complete and rather, will always be open 
to possible mutations.  
This sentiment is expressed in two distinct, but interrelated ways by Karl Polanyi 
and Anna Tsing. In Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, he highlights how attempts at 
the complete commodification of land, labor and money will always result in widespread, 
adverse impacts and inevitably lead to some degree of active resistance against moves to 
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fully realize such efforts. In Tsing’s Friction, An Ethnography of Global Connection, she 
highlights how in contemporary Indonesia, general concepts derived outside the country 
regarding economic development and resource extraction as well as the attempt to 
objectively understand (and hence use) its rainforests by employing non-context specific 
scientific knowledges will always be in friction with local epistemological and 
ontological paradigms and thus generate hybrid subjectivities and societal structures. One 
of the ways to destabilize the seemingly constraining structuralist logic of the 
technoscientific and capitalist version of reality is to perceive the construction of urban, 
periurban and rural space as always mutating and dynamic, neither never fully 
determined nor static, always subject to a mélange of influences and contestations. For 
example, understanding the logics behind Bangalore’s expansion would require 
understanding the current operation of  
“national and international restructuring of capital….As capitalist activity is always 
grounded somewhere, it is found that the diverse material processes in a given spatiality 
continuously get appropriated by the process of capital accumulation. The construction of 
globalization thus is found to have largely depended not only on geographical 
reorganization of economic activities but also historically evolved cultural landscapes. In 
the process, it has built and rebuilt geography of regions in its own images, creating 
newer socio-economic landscapes with produced space of infrastructure and institutions 
for the purpose of facilitating capital accumulation” (Banerjee-Guha, 2008, 52).  
 
Hence, while capital accumulation seems to have emerged as the overriding 
motivation in how forms of spatial organization currently continually evolve over time 
and displace older material infrastructures socio-economic activity and practices, there is 
no inherent need to attribute it with a quality of inherent necessity. Furthermore, by 
emphasizing that processes of spatial change (i.e. land acquisition) are “contradictory, 
uneven and crisis ridden” (ibid) rather than occurring as a result of the straightforward 
implementation of government policies framed with neoliberal economic doctrine, it is at 
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the very least possible in theory to imagine alternatives that do not conform with this 
dominant profit motive. This is especially so given that the dictates of capitalist structures 
and market relations are not pre-existing, eternal ideas that individuals instinctively obey. 
Instead, their manifestations in social life only result from the attempt at “creating an 
"utopia" of a free market, [requiring] in practice... a dramatic intensification of a coercive 
disciplinary form of state intervention to impose market rule” (Banerjee-Guha, 2008, 58). 
Whilst processes of “destructive ensemble of obsoletism and rebuilding, ephemerality 
and reinterpretation diffuses across the old spaces, displacing the existing use values and 
altering the discursive as well as the material geography of such spaces” (Banerjee-Guha, 
2008, 54), one should not assume that a deterministic logic that is at work will 
necessarily eradicate pre-existing social structures and cultural meaning and lead to a 
character of homogenization of new spatial forms. Rather, it is within these processes of 
change themselves that can give rise to the realization of open-ended alternative futures, 
which also disputes the characterization of local cultural and economic practices as static 
and deficient. The first step is to emphatically acknowledge this possibility at a discursive 
level instead of giving in to the seemingly seductive modernist technocratic and 
neoliberal rhetoric. 
Thus, the analytical lens of critical urban studies offers a compelling alternative 
understanding of how ideational influences in dialectic with material infrastructures 
inform the constitution of the global city. Firstly, it understands current trends of global 
urbanization as not the smooth extension within a frontier mentality logic of urban forms 
already achieved in the Global North towards Global South contexts such as India, but as 
driven by a unstable neoliberal logic that ceaselessly desires to increase capital 
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accumulation. Therefore, capital requires outlets where it can be invested to earn 
maximum returns and thus “cities today are embedded within a highly uncertain geo-
economic environment, characterized by monetary instability, speculative movements of 
financial capital, global location strategies by major transnational corporations and 
intensifying interlocal competition” (Peck et al, 2009, 57). Rather than the romanticized 
notion of economic growth generating win-win opportunities, the enactment of neoliberal 
doctrines require a “‘natural state’ [that is] intensely variegated and persistently unstable 
topography” (Peck et al, 2009, 52) so that owners of capital can locate their investments 
where they are reasonably assured that returns can be maximized. While much of this 
literature attempts to explain trends in the Global North, I argue similar tendencies also 
occur in places such as Bangalore. Hence, state and local governments have bought in to 
the supposed necessity of aligning their policies with this logic by “engaging in short-
termist forms of interspatial competition, place-marketing and regulatory undercutting in 
order to attract investment and jobs…[as] cities and their suburban zones of influence 
have become increasingly important geographical targets and institutional laboratories for 
a variety of neoliberal policy experiments” (Peck et al, 2009, 58). In this vein, we again 
should not perceive the Indian 21st century economy as on a teleological progressivist 
trajectory. Rather, it is informed by “continued turbulence…[that is] reflective of 
neoliberalism’s contradictory creativity—its capacity to repeatedly respond to endemic 
failures of policy design and implementation through a range of crisis-displacing 
strategies, fast-policy adjustments, and experimental reforms” (Peck et al, 2009, 64) that 
allow adverse impacts to matter little.  
89 
 
While it is increasingly the case that “more privatization and deregulation, more 
subjection of urban development decisions to market logics, a continued delinking of 
land-use systems from relays of popular-democratic control and public 
accountability...and a further subordination of place and territory to speculative strategies 
of profit-making at the expense of use values” (Peck et al, 2013, 1092) is taking place, we 
should not permit these shifts to fully shut out alternative forms of spatial organization 
and economic structuring. Hence, even as substantive resistance may seem unlikely given 
the hegemony of dominant ideational framework down to the level of the individual 
subject, “profit-oriented strategies of urban restructuring [remain] intensely contested 
among dominant, subordinate and marginalized social forces….Urban space under 
capitalism is therefore never permanently fixed; it is continually shaped and reshaped 
through a relentless clash of opposed social forces oriented, respectively, towards the 
exchange-value (profit-oriented) and use-value (everyday life) dimensions of urban 
sociospatial configurations” (Brenner et al, 2012, 206). Similar to how scientific 
agricultural knowledges cannot fully comprehend land’s ecological complexity in an 
effort to improve its production capabilities, it is by recognizing that rational, 
technocratic initiatives such as SEZ policies are unable to fully eradicate pre-existing 
socio-cultural meanings historically embedded in landscapes that push-back can possibly 
arise. Hence, even as market logic has come to dominate much of Bangalorean (and 
Indian) rural and urban life with ongoing spatial transformations, we could say that what 
is going on is analogous to the situation in post-industrial contexts in the Global North.  
“Even within industrial landscapes that have been systematically devalued by capital, 
social attachments to place persist as people struggle to defend the everyday practices and 
institutional compromises from which capital has sought to extricate itself” (Brenner and 
Theodore, 2002, 355)  
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It is this non-deterministic stance that must be underscored, in affirming the 
ultimately utopian quality of the desire to wholly subjectify individuals to align their 
behaviors and attitudes according to the dictates of the market. Thus, what actually is an 
eclecity of external influences and pre-existing practices manifests itself in the production 
of space “as a historically specific, ongoing, and internally contradictory process of 
market-driven sociospatial transformation, rather than as a fully actualized policy regime, 
ideological form, or regulatory framework” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, 353). The 
prominent geographer Henri Lefebvre's “expansive idea of space that takes into account 
what he calls perceived space, conceived space, and lived space” (Purcell, 2003, 577) is a 
particularly useful tool to bring about multiplicitous understandings of “space.” His 
characterization would privilege meaning creation derived from the subjective lived 
experiences of individuals and communities and not defined by the impersonality of the 
materiality of spatial forms that are actualized on the basis of top-down technocratic 
visions. By doing so, we can see how “conceived spaces of the planner and the 
bureaucrat as well as those produced by the action of the capitalist market, confront the 
lived spaces of everyday life as something separate and alien….[thus never completely 
ruling out] the site of possibility of ‘difference’ from the homogenizing rationality of 
abstract space in capitalism” (Bridge, 2013, 10). Just as how ideas and material 
infrastructures associated with agricultural modernization attempts at unproblematically 
imposing themselves onto what is presumed to be empty space (or where context does not 
matter and can justifiably be obliterated) though pervasive, have failed, broader urban 
planning initiatives that come in the form of   
“programs of neoliberalization are doomed to coexist in fields of socio-institutional 
difference, dwelling amongst their ideological others, more often than not 
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antagonistically. Thus, even as it organizes the leading fronts of market-driven regulatory 
transformation —consistent with its character as a paradigm of restructuring, rather than 
as a condition or end-state — neoliberalization is never found alone. There is always 
more going on than neoliberalism; there are always other active sources and forces of 
regulatory change; there are always countervailing interests, pressures and visions” (Peck 
et al, 2013, 1093). 
 
These sentiments are also expressed more specifically in the Asian/Indian context 
with Ong (2011) explicitly using the assemblage lens to examine the constitution and 
reconstitution of cities during this specific temporal moment by “view[ing them] not as a 
fixed locality, but as a particular nexus of situated and transnational ideas, institutions, 
actors, and practices that may be variously drawn together for solving particular 
problems.” She is critical of  
“universal capitalist and postcolonial variants of neo-Marxism [that] rely on singular 
logics of global change, [that] focus on [the] homogenizing effects of capitalism and 
colonialism that are presumed to account for uniform conditions in a huge swath of cities 
throughout the world. [Rather, they] take the vantage point of an Asian region that cannot 
be reduced to the uniform expectations, logics, and prescriptions of structural Marxism or 
postcolonial theory….Urban environments are animated by a variety of transnational and 
local institutions, actors and practices that cannot be neatly mapped out in advance as 
being on the side of power or on the side of resistance, as if positions could be so 
unproblematically delineated. Only by liberating the city as a conceptual container of 
capitalism and subaltern agency can different analytical approaches explore methods for 
explaining how an urban situation can be at once heterogeneously particular and yet 
irreducibly global” (Ong, 2011, 9). 
 
It is this hybrid approach that acknowledges the presence of influences that escape simple 
static categorization and at the same time is “open to the multiplicity of events, 
interrelationships, and factors that, in ways both chaotic and strategic, expected and 
unforeseen, are in play in the formation of particular urban environments.” Instead of 
understanding spatial transformations as pre-determined subsumption of local places by 
the logic of capital inflows and technological adoption, they should be seen “as a 
problem-space in which a cast of disparate actors – the state, capitalists, NGOs, foreign 
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experts, and ordinary people” (Ong, 2011, 10), open to contestation, albeit with power 
differentials given that particular ideas have greater clout.  
 Nevertheless, a crucial problematization of the descriptor “global” simultaneously 
emerges in that it disputes the portrayal of this posited external context-less ideal as 
representing the normative epitome of a set of practices and characteristics that all 
individuals and communities must strive towards (i.e. global city). Hence, rather than 
assume the inevitable integration of urban landscape into the global circuits of capital or 
“see the city as a fixed space or node, [one should] approach the metropolis as a milieu of 
experimentation where diverse actors and institutions invent and aspire to new ways of 
being global, and in doing so, recuperate the global not as the endpoint to an already 
given urban developmental process, but as a terrain of problematization” (Ong, 2011, 23). 
The discursive destabilization of this signifier in emphasizing the potential of dynamism 
and unpredictability itself has implications on imagining urban futures. By verbifying the 
related term “world,” “worlding…[we retrieve] the idea of emergence, to claims that 
global situations are always in formation,” always in a process of becoming, always 
eluding pre-given norms or criteria. Once there is affirmation that there is “no singular or 
fixed standard of urban globality [but rather] there are many forms of “the global” in 
play” (Ong, 2011, 12) will there be the weakening of supposed universal applicability of 
technocratic norms, technoscientific infrastructures and neoliberal economic doctrine. 
It is possible to extend this assemblage logic to bring about analytical complexity 
in apprehending current logics of agrarian change. The first step would be to recognize 
how the top-down, external imposition of agricultural modernization ideas and 
infrastructures not only has taken place at a contingent moment in time, but it will also 
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always clash with and fail to completely eliminate local context given its complexity that 
has historically accumulated. Hence, rather than accept an inability to break out of the 
frontier mentality paradigm of seemingly never-ending technical and policy innovation, 
we could derive an opening in actualizing meaningful alternatives from its continued 
failures exemplified in actually existing small farmer livelihood precarity and its 
incomplete implementation over the last half-century or so. Accordingly, this would 
constitute an admission that it is wrongheaded to assume that objective scientific 
knowledge and its predominantly quantitative representations can fully understand nature 
and its ecological processes. As alluded to earlier, it leads to a misguided anthropocentric 
viewpoint that perceives land as merely an exploitable resource that is easily manipulable 
for human ends (of capital accumulation and profit maximization).  
 A more concrete strategy towards imagining, discussing and ultimately 
actualizing such “spaces” (both conceptual and physical) is to characterize the 
subjectivity of small farmers as well as the landscapes they inhabit as having a hybrid and 
open-ended quality as we see in the non-elite urban subject and urban form through the 
lens of critical urban studies. By doing so, it can be illustrated that there does not exist 
singular, linear influences that narrowly and deterministically constrain how individuals 
and collective communities make decisions on how to reproduce their livelihoods as well 
as retain, organize and use their land. As a result, we are able to retrieve some degree of 
agency in the small farmer, disputing their characterization as deficient subjects who 
passively and mechanistically carry out the dictates of agricultural technologies (i.e. 
following exact instructions on how much chemicals to apply) or make production 
decisions solely on the basis of short-term market demand (McMichael, 2008). Akhil 
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Gupta’s Postcolonial Developments based on his own field experiences in northern India 
back in the 1980-90s shows how “while being fundamentally shaped by colonial 
modernities, many of the everyday practices displayed a distinct lack of fit with the 
dichotomy of modern and traditional” (Gupta, 1998, 9). As this highlights how 
discursive categories themselves give a reductionist view of reality as they cannot 
adequately apprehend interwoven socio-cultural-ecological entanglements that continue 
to unfold, “they can be looked at neither as shining examples of development nor as 
exemplars of ecological correctness. As hybridized, syncretic, inappropriate, postcolonial 
subjects, they enter as a disturbing presence that continuously interrupts the redemptive 
narratives of the West” (Gupta, 1998, 232).  
This can be illustrated by the interactions I had with farmers and specific resolute 
opinions many harbored despite the rapid transformations that are taking place. Firstly, it 
was pointed out that despite the harsh economic and ecological context, many, especially 
amongst the older generation remain able to grow ragi to meet the most basic of 
subsistence needs. They specifically find satisfaction in being able to do so as more than 
just an example of livelihood provisioning, but also as an enduring cultural practice, 
whilst simultaneously critiquing the shallowness and the corrupting potential in the allure 
of money, especially in terms of the breakdown in community relations at the village 
level. Many also express how an individual’s worth cannot be determined on the basis of 
one’s wealth. In this vein, one specific group extends this discussion on pride into a 
social critique of how urbanites who may richer in terms of monetary wealth, but have no 
knowledge on how to produce their own food and hence are unable to subsist in times of 
potential crisis. Furthermore, many are adamant in the opposition to their characterization 
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as backward, inefficient farmers who are perennially dependent on government welfare. 
Rather, they see themselves as adept producers who despite the harsh ecological and 
economic environment are able to provide substantial amounts of cheap food that serve 
as the backbone of the country’s economic development story. Secondly, as a result of 
being able to understand the pitfalls of technological (over)use as mentioned earlier, 
some farmers also allocate land for specific crops, especially of basic staples to be grown 
without the use of chemical inputs for their own household consumption. A similar logic 
is also applied to milk consumption, wherein whenever possible, only milk that is derived 
from native cow species are consumed by farmer households. Thirdly, even as the 
number of crop varieties used in intercropping have decreased, this practice has not 
completely disappeared for some farmers. In recognizing that long-term soil health 
cannot be sustained on the basis of chemical fertilizers, such practices continue to be used 
in addition to crop rotation. Almost all the farmers I interacted with emphasized no 
matter what decision is made to sow a specific crop, they will never plant the same crop 
on the same plot of land on a consecutive basis. 
In addition, I had the opportunity to speak to an activist who works closely with 
small farmers and KRRS with regards to welfare of individual small farmers as well as 
getting involved with broader regional, state, national and international agrarian politics. 
Our discussions focused on how agricultural production and the issues surrounding it is 
not merely a narrow question confined to the realm of the economy. Rather, given its 
historical embeddedness in local and regional culture, a community sense of justice 
through social movements linger on. Examples were given in terms of farmer 
communities mobilizing themselves to obtain debt forgiveness and cash transfers for 
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individual farmers who have entered into exploitative debt arrangements and are unable 
to meet immediate payment obligations. The activist also pointed to the persistence of a 
sense of rural justice in India more broadly, in addition to how the urban elite have 
become somewhat nostalgic of Gandhian notions of self-sufficiency. It was also 
mentioned that KRRS is one of the leading state-level farmer movements in the country 
(~30,000 participate at state-level meetings) with a specific youth wing to ensure that the 
next generation recognize the importance of remaining engaged in agricultural 
production. Not only do they continue to fight against major land acquisition such as 
ongoing fight regarding the construction of the Kudgi coal power plant in Northern 
Karnataka, they have historically been part of Indian Coordinating Committee of 
Farmers’ Movements who have for many years attempted to mobilize against the World 
Trade Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture that set out provisions to limit domestic 
price supports and subsidies as well as reduce import tariffs for agricultural products. 
Lastly, but significantly, it was only pointed out that KRRS is building capacity amongst 
farmers around zero budget natural farming (ZBNF) production practices that would 
eliminate the use of inputs and credit. This system would rely on intercropping of up to 
70 different crops as well as fertilizers derived from cow urine and manure, stirred for 
around 45 days. It has been noted that some youth are excited by the prospects of 
adopting such practices that will go some way to retrieve traditional knowledges that 
have laid dormant in the past half century.  
Furthermore, given both the physical/material (movements of people, partial 
dependence of households on non-agricultural incomes, city’s outward expansion) and 
conceptual linkages (logic of developmentalism) between “rural” and “urban” in the 
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context of the Bangalore metropolitan area, these categories in themselves are not 
inimical to continuous resignification, undermining their definition as a supposed static 
set of generalizable axioms. My first-hand experience in attempting to inhabit the 
Bangalorean phenomenological lifeworld attests to this in many ways. Firstly, the 
distribution of land-use outside the city center highlights that while there are contiguous 
parcels of land acquired for industrial or residential estates, it is unlikely that any attempt 
to rationally plan out the entire metropolitan region is ever likely to succeed. Any such 
undertaking would require the subsumption of numerous town centers that dot the 
landscape and which serve as centers of non-agricultural informal economies where 
much of the poor attempt to eke out a living. Given that it is highly unlikely that jobs in 
the formal sector can be found for these populations, contestations and resistances against 
grand visions of the Bangalorean global city will undoubtedly play out for the foreseeable 
future. Further evidence of this can be seen in the sheer liveliness and spontaneity of 
everyday life on the periphery of the core of the city characterized by the constant flows 
of people as they go about their daily lives in attempting to leverage on any opportunity 
to reproduce their livelihoods. The ubiquitous presence of cows even in highly 
rationalized formal built-up areas such as the Electronic City cityscape symbolize its 
hybrid urban-nature quality and shows the persistence of local phenomena despite the 
influence of seemingly overbearing exogenous top-down forces that gain their legitimacy 
from abstract technocratic ideals embedded in the logic of developmentalism.  Even the 
negative consequences of rapid urban growth such as traffic bottlenecks and waste strewn 
in the streets demonstrate the inability of rational policymaking to fully enact its global 
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city vision given that the desire for a sanitized city conducive for the smooth functioning 
of so-called high-value economic sectors would seem to be difficult to realize. 
At the same time, we must be wary of the possibility that these resilient practices 
small farmer households are able to employ will be perceived as potential evidence of 
possession of innate entrepreneurial values. If they are characterized as such, status quo 
will be reinforced with their subsumption under neoliberal logics emphasizing the ability 
of the individual self taking place at the expense of attending to structural inequities. In 
this vein, we also must not romanticize such adaptive capabilities to the extent that we 
downplay the admittedly precarious livelihood situations that many small farmer 
households face in “spaces” such as that of periurban Bangalore.  
Hence, as we discursively open up the possibilities in imagining and enacting 
meaningful alternative, it is absolutely necessary to interrogate currently existing trends 
and initiatives that arguably can either be construed as an extension of dominant modes 
of agrarian and economic production or as starting points to envision a radically different 
vision of socio-economic structuring. Partha Chatterjee’s notion of political society calls 
attention to empirical phenomena in the vein of the Polanyian double movement of actual 
push-back against the attempt to integrate the lower class populations into the logic of the 
national and global capitalist economy. It understands how central and state governments 
must at least to some extent be responsive to the non-elite majority and hence “what the 
state is and does, and why, must accordingly also be investigated from the standpoint of 
the lower classes, and especially in terms of their struggle against the state and the 
propertied classes. In this dialectic, the fact that the Indian state is engaged in reproducing 
the political and economic interests of ‘those above’ does not go unchallenged by ‘those 
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below’” (Das, 2007, 415). In this vein, it needs to be recognized that some level of 
governmental intervention in activities such as the provisioning basic needs for the poor 
majority is absolutely necessary for (at least an illusion of) social order and governmental 
legitimacy to be maintained in addition to quelling potentially disruptive grievances and 
social discontent resulting from livelihood precarity and socio-spatial dislocation. 
Arguably, this acts as a significant barrier towards the full realization of neoliberal and 
technoscientific plans of agricultural production that the elites desire to implement as it is 
“considered unacceptable that those who are dispossessed of their means of labor [or 
land] because of the primitive accumulation of capital should have no means of 
subsistence” (Chatterjee, 2011, 20). Significantly, these ideational, policy and 
infrastructural logics have become entrenched over time given that    
“the spread of governmental technologies in India in the last three decades, as a result of 
the deepening reach of the developmental state under conditions of electoral democracy 
has meant that the state is no longer an external entity to the peasant community. 
Governmental agencies distributing education, health services, food, roadways, water, 
electricity, agricultural technology, emergency relief and dozens of other welfare services 
have penetrated deep into the interior of everyday peasant life. Not only are peasants 
dependent on state agencies for these services, they have also acquired considerable skill 
in manipulating and pressurizing these agencies to deliver these benefits” (Chatterjee, 
2011, 18). 
 
This sentiment aligns well with a common trope as I have mentioned in how 
many farmers I interacted with primarily targeted their not only their anger and 
frustration towards the local and state government. They also continued to have a 
justifiable sense of expectation of governmental assistance given the continued urban and 
industrial bias. In this sense, it could be argued that “the forms of capitalist industrial 
growth now underway in India will make room for the preservation of the peasantry, but 
under completely altered conditions” (Chatterjee, 2011, 17), thus calling into question the 
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vision of elite economic policy in catering to and romanticizing the emergence of urban 
middle and upper classes in being able to be fully actualized. In this sense, it is important 
to push back against   
“assumptions of an unequivocal cutting of public expenditure that are often invoked to 
substantiate the claim of state retreat seem especially awkward against the background of 
the militarization of large swaths of the country in central India…..[given that] the state is 
also highly visible in a proliferation of social sector interventions over the past 10 years” 
(Munster and Strumpell 2014, 8). 
 
Hence, the future of the Indian socio-economic structures is open to non-deterministic 
contestation in that “it is the political response to this challenge that will determine 
whether the rural poor will remain vulnerable to the manipulative strategies of capital and 
the state or whether they might use the terrain of governmental activities to assert their 
own claims to a life of worth and dignity” (Chatterjee, 2011, 31) 
More concretely, these political entitlements for the poor include “nation-wide 
schemes framed in the language of rights: the Right to Food, the Right to Information, the 
Right to Work….[with arguably the most significant policy coming in the form of] the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of 2005, introduced by a 
government bent on liberalization but concerned as well about the threat of dissent from 
les classes dangereuses” (Corbridge and Shah, 2013, 336-337) (renamed with ‘Mahatma 
Gandhi’ prefix and now known as MGNREGA). In this vein, it is also possible to 
understand how given that “different Indian governments are worried about getting re-
elected, [they] therefore pay some attention to the issue of increasing rural distress….in 
some states, power subsidies have been re-introduced in a big way…[while there existed 
at the central level] a high-powered debt committee to make recommendations about 
rural credit structures” (Vakulabharanam and Motiram, 2011, 122). Also, resistance 
101 
 
efforts in recent years all over the country against unbridled land acquisition have also 
been successful in that affected communities “have used the ideology of the Nehruvian 
regime of dispossession against its neoliberal successor, with considerable success. They 
have made land acquisition an electorally salient issue for the first time in India’s history, 
and forced a series of project cancellations, policy retreats and efforts at class 
compromise” (Levien, 2013, 404), which could then snowball and inspire the 
continuation of such anti-dispossession movements. In addition, far-reaching and 
expansive national policies such as the Public Distribution System (the largest subsidized 
food program in the world) and longstanding battles towards fully complying with 
international intellectual property standards illustrate how the central government is 
unable, if not unwilling to fully liberalize and conform to neoliberal economic doctrine. 
Aihwa Ong in Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty 
shows how “neoliberalism” can manifest itself in multiplicitous ways in different 
contexts in different parts of Asia and hence the notion of an exogenous force subsuming 
societies, cultures and spaces under its logic in a straightforward, linear manner is both 
discursively and empirically imprecise. Significantly, the allocation for the important 
MGNREGA scheme has grown significantly in recent years. “From 2.1% of annual 
public expenditure, a modest Rs 11,000 crore in 2005-06, it has grown to Rs 39,100 crore 
in 2009-10 (3.8%) for 40 million workers at Rs 100 a day. But the higher allocation for 
MGNREGA also means there is less left over for other social programmes given very 
tight budget constraints and the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 
(FRBM)” (Shrivastava and Kothari, 2012, 118), which illustrates that any policy welfare 
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concession are still constrained by a technocratic outlook that dominates a narrow 
paradigm that informs policymaking processes today. 
However, it is this vast-reaching FBRM Act that symbolizes how policy 
concessions that attempt to meet the political demands from below ultimately do not 
fundamentally alter or question the overarching neoliberal doctrine that structures 
contemporary society and economy in India. Notwithstanding, it could be argued that 
these compromises (un)wittingly allow status quo to be sustained, further entrenching and 
naturalizing market relations and capitalist logic in the Indian economy moving forward. 
Another aspect to this “delusion” of the prospects of significant change is how the 
electoral process has been romanticized as the critical site of political contestation. It has 
been interpreted as  
“a secular form of religion for the masses, [with] the capacity to exercise the vote at 
intervals provid[ing] agricultural workers and peasants with the illusion that it is they 
who exercise control over the state and the dominant classes. Not only does this fuel the 
hope that they gain material benefits from electoral patronage, but it also perpetuates the 
belief that if not this party/leader then the next one in power will address their problems” 
(Das, 2007, 419).  
 
These observations raise basic, but ultimately unresolvable questions regarding 
how one would identify and define meaningful and substantive qualitative shifts from the 
current paradigm of agricultural production and neoliberal developmentalism, taking into 
account as I have elaborated how farmers and their households, especially those who 
were born into the post-Green Revolution generation have internalized and willingly 
accepted, although not completely, the necessity and desirability of technologically-
intensive and market-oriented production practices and the trope of improvement, 
institutionalized since the moment of India’s independence. In this vein, if we are to 
concede that small farmers are now able to choose to make autonomous production 
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decisions to reproduce their livelihoods, the criteria for institutionalizing policies that will 
alleviate the smallholder agrarian crisis would very look different than if a fundamental 
shift is seen as necessary.  
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Chapter X: Speculations and Conclusion 
Given this impasse, the trajectory and extent of change from the current moment 
with regards to the character of agricultural production remains unclear and ultimately are 
non-deterministic. While Chatterjee’s idea of the political society will ensure that 
contestations will persist and the basic welfare needs of the (agrarian) poor will be met 
outside the logic of neoliberal economic doctrine, the immediate delinking from global 
economy remains unlikely. In addition, as mentioned in the introduction, any step 
towards decoupling agricultural production from technology and credit would further 
need to counter Prime Minister Modi’s right-wing economic vision. Hence, with 
plausibly the enabling environment for smallholder production (i.e. further reduction in 
input subsidies, liberalizing national (regional) and international agricultural markets) 
worsening in years ahead, fraught political contestations will be fought not only in 
periurban Bangalore, but throughout the country to prevent corporate consolidation in the 
agricultural sector wherein an increasing number of small farmers are (un)willingly 
alienated from their land. The concomitant increases in contract, plantation style-farming 
arrangements will further reduce the role of the small farmer as passive providers of 
labor-power.   
On another level, instead of assuming that corporate control of the agricultural 
sector is a positive phenomenon or that millions of small farmers should or will 
necessarily move out of agriculture into the non-agricultural sector, efforts should be 
made to “revalue” food production as a meaningful economic activity. At a basic level, it 
has been noted that many small farmers across the country have “eschewed a demand for 
land redistribution and instead fought for higher output prices, lower input prices, lower 
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taxes and loan waivers (Vakulabharanam and Motiram, 2011, 117), which would form a 
major component of a possible return to a version of left-welfarist policies during the pre-
neoliberal era without the urban/industrial bias. This could align with a sentiment Prime 
Minister Nehru himself made in one of his first speeches to the Indian parliament with 
the following:  
“we have to remember that major industries do not solve the problem of unemployment 
among the hundreds of millions of this country. For that we will have to depend more and 
more on village and cottage industries and develop them on a large scale. We have to 
remember that we cannot set aside the human factor. We do want more production, but 
more than that, we want better human beings” (Nehru, 1956, 5).    
 
Virtually all the farmers I spoke to identified that government policies and incentives 
significantly contribute to production decisions. They point to how current policy 
frameworks are not farmer-centric, but ultimately benefit the interests of industrial 
agriculture (i.e. subsidies for chemical inputs eventually accrue to the private companies 
that produce them). This is illustrated by how many express that are few incentives for 
organic compost, natural fencing, traditional cows, non-mechanized carts but a 
significant amount allocated for barbed wire (to delineate private farm plots), cement, 
tractors and hybrid cows. Therefore, to reduce dependency arrangements and vicious 
cycles that reinforce them, many desire the government to promote initiatives such as 
increasing livestock numbers and the provision of grazing land to allow for nutrient 
virtuous cycles to re-emerge. It is this kind of concerted rural investment that give 
farmers the explicit opportunity to be able to transition away from chemicalized 
agriculture. As a result, agricultural production would become a more viable economic 
activity, thus reducing the reliance on the informal non-agricultural sector for livelihood 
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reproduction. Village life would be more “alive” and hence, there would be potential for 
moral economies and community cultural practices to be revitalized once again.     
In this regard, there is certainly potential for farmers’ organizations/movements 
from the village to the state (i.e. KRRS) and finally to the national level are able to 
strengthen and subsequently effectively engage the political process using a myriad of 
strategies and tactics to leverage these recurrent concerns. One example would be 
government revenues derived from taxing urban/industrial development be allocated for 
agricultural programs. At the same time, a deep-rooted commitment to intensive 
technological use must be disposed of for a number of ecological, economic and socio-
cultural reasons. While this does not necessarily entail complete disengagement with 
technological input and the wider market economy (in terms of procuring inputs, selling 
outputs and purchasing livelihood necessities), it would entail an appreciation for the 
complexity and uncertainty involved in the interaction of different production factors that 
cannot be essentialized by means of scientific and quantitative abstraction. Consequently, 
it would simultaneously require an embrace of contextually defined ecological limits. 
Hence, a disavowal for production decisions by all agricultural stakeholders (including 
consumers) geared around short-term market demand is necessary, with the central 
element motivating production for farmers oriented around monetary accumulation and 
the profit motive also weakening or ceasing. In this sense, the re-legitimization and 
rediffusion of rapidly disappearing traditional agroecological knowledges through 
government and non-governmental efforts need to occur, which could be hybridized with 
contextualized and place-based participatory scientific agricultural research. This 
paradigm would also need to explicitly address concerns over benefit-sharing and 
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intellectual property rights resulting from already existing power differentials and norms 
entrenched in current institutional frameworks. 
However, if one were to accept the normative and political claim that a 
fundamental move away from the dominant production logic is beneficial, I contend that 
a further step would be necessary to actualize consequential alternatives that latch onto 
the currently existing pockets of ambivalent sentiment amongst village communities and 
households to engender ontological transformations on how socio-cultural and economic 
realities are conceived and in doing so, modify the foundational motivations behind 
agricultural production. Firstly, it would completely disavow the frontier mentality that 
perceives the telos of current human activity as working towards the full realization of a 
natural market and technological reality with nature instrumentalized and manipulated as 
a resource for human ends. This explicit non-capitalist orientation would rather envisage 
ontological worldviews that perceive reality as co-produced and co-constituted by human 
and non-humans in entangled assemblage socio-natures that will always escape static, 
scientific and universalizable abstraction, quantification and categorization. In this sense, 
this paradigm would break free from understanding agricultural goods as mere 
commodities, a logic that romanticizes purported innate human innovation that aims to 
maximize production of these “objects” for accruing exchange-value. Instead, it 
recognizes that knowledges governing our lifeworlds cannot cleanly separate out 
subjective cultural meanings that reduce our existences to monetizable values, thus itself 
suggesting the incompleteness of neoliberal logics in fully realizing its aim to colonize 
our subjectivities.  
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In this sense, engendering these ontological shifts would be an explicitly political 
act to emphasize the incommensurability of different socio-cultural and economic 
practices that cannot be essentialized on the basis of objective statistical indicators (i.e. 
GDP, productivity) that implicitly reinforce tropes of undevelopment and development. It 
is a deliberate standpoint that refuses comparability between different individuals, 
villages, communities, regions and countries on the basis of commitment to agricultural 
modernization. Whether these shifts are possible is a difficult proposition to ascertain 
given the societal dislocations, dominant economic, institutional and technological 
framework and change in psyches and subjectivities that have led to widespread 
acquiescence, ambivalence or willing acceptance with the project of developmentalist 
modernization over the last half century or so since the country’s independence. This 
tension of acknowledging the dominance of the logic of capital to be able to effectively 
critique its seemingly ubiquity without giving it excessive explanatory power that would 
inadvertently reinforce and legitimize its seeming naturalness is best captured by the 
geographer Vinay Gidwani in the following:  
“With its heterogeneous fractions enabled by variegated circuits of human and nonhuman 
joinings, capital has always led a parasitic existence. It has always contained multiple 
histories. And each of these histories, even when life is structured-in-dominance to 
capitalist value, has remained an interlacing of multiple value-productions that are not-
capital” (Gidwani, 2011, 229).  
 
In conclusion, in this honors thesis, I have shown how the discourses of 
agricultural modernization and the logic of developmentalism have gained legitimacy and 
naturalized themselves as “truth regimes” that are not merely coercively imposed by an 
external, imperial power, but are willingly accepted or acquiesced to at the individual 
level. Coupled with the seemingly irreversible vicious cycles that arise, especially with 
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the onset of the purported objective quality of neoliberal economic doctrine and 
commitment to the need to accept unceasing agricultural technological innovation in the 
post-Green Revolution context, the resulting socio-economic context would seem to 
constrain the possibility of realizing alternative modes of production and modes of being 
more broadly. This self-fulfilling logic and inadvertent subsidization by farmers of non-
agricultural economic activity (in terms of the provision of cheap labor, cheap food and 
increasing reliance on non-agricultural incomes) would also further manifest itself in a 
sentiment of resignedness by some farmers to the threat arising from land acquisition 
given the increasing non-viability of smallholder production.  
However, I have also attempted to highlight how this dominant process that 
attempts to subsume existing context under an abstracted instrumentalist and scientific 
epistemology has not been total and will never be complete. An assemblage theory lens 
brings to the forefront notions of contingency, contestation and dynamism and analyzes 
actually existing phenomenon as hybridities. Therefore, even as these hegemonic 
discourses and policies subjectified farmers into structuring their production primarily for 
the market, bringing them into the wage economy and placing the onus on the individual 
to be responsible for their own success, pockets of resistance and ambivalence exist with 
regards to if this trajectory was the only possible option. This shows that attempts at 
romanticizing ideals of modernization and development using scientific abstractions and 
generalized representations are tools to discount and ignore historically accumulated and 
spatially contextual heterogeneities and power relations. 
Hence, with the noted dislocations in specific areas such as periurban Bangalore 
regarding the increasing non-viability of smallholder agriculture and the failed promises 
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of the 21st century global city to provide for decent livelihood needs for a majority of its 
population, the latest iteration of technocratic capitalist policies are ultimately utopic and 
cannot be implemented unproblematically. There is potential for intensifying resistance 
with more obvious dislocations resulting from land acquisition as well as failures in the 
promises of neoliberal discourse/project becoming more tangible in periurban Bangalore 
and other similar contexts throughout the country. Given this predicament, it is the “site” 
of the periurban where the visceral material and ideational clash of what are fluid 
categories of the “rural” and the “urban,” the “local” and the “global” and the 
“backward” and the “advanced” continue to play out. Acknowledging these terms as 
floating signifiers whose meanings are never static will hence allow imagining possible 
systemic changes that are non-deterministic and in addition do not accord with the ideal 
of developmentalism   
In this sense, what is now represented in dominant discourses emanating from 
stakeholders such as the World Bank and those who attend the World Food Prize as the 
unproblematic progressivist implementation of seemingly depoliticized technologies is a 
false one and in fact, its non-totalizability only goes to show the utopian character of 
purist external solutions. Hence, these “technical approaches favored by developers – 
breaking down social and political problems into decontextualized, modular, 
generalizable schematics – had long been ahistorical” (Gubser, 2012, 1809) are never 
fully realizable in praxis. In doing so, a critique of technocratic development emerges that 
interrogates the hubris of scientific rationality in the ability of experts to completely 
understand, manipulate and manage the natural environment and the people living in 
them. Again, it is by recognizing that while there is nothing inherently natural or 
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necessary regarding the need to modernize and develop or adhere to economic laws in 
today’s free market society, these ideas have become real in everyday Indian society and 
that successful resistances require the emergence of a counternarrative that normatively 
seeks the realization of alternative modernities that earnestly desires non-conformity from 
the logic of capital. In this vein, I reiterate my main contribution to the scholarly 
conversation lies in the extension of the widespread use of the assemblage theory lens in 
critical urban studies to critical agrarian studies in analyzing not only the Bangalore 
urban core, but also its material, physical and ideational linkages to agricultural 
production in its periurban surroundings to understand how knowledge claims that 
structure dominant agricultural practices have historically and up till today remain 
contested at village-level spatial scale in the everyday life of small farmers. 
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